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Abstract 
In the early 1980s, within the wider structural adjustment and 
liberalisation framework, financial sector reform were initiated to allow 
greater facility of market forces in the pricing and allocation of financial 
resources. The sector has been increasingly liberalised since then with 
subsequent on-going reform addressing the legislative and regulatory 
frameworks. The on-going reforms have sought to improve resource 
flows for productive investment. Nevertheless, there are persistent 
fractures and imperfections in the credit market.  
Development banking seeks to define and resolve the 
imperfections in credit markets and to address concerns regarding 
social equity by targeting loan and other support resources to priority 
sectors that seek to use underemployed resources for capital 
accumulation and growth.  
This document is concerned with how development banks might 
be reformed to be part of the wider agenda of development of the 
financial sector.  
The paper argues that the key reforms needed must emerge from 
the introduction of derivative instruments into the financial markets 
that define, price and market, and hence spread, the significant credit 
risk attached primarily to provision of credit as either working capital 
or finance for fixed capacity building to create capital or to absorb it 
into production of consumer goods and services. Reforms of 
development banking are proposed that focus on their role as 
counterparty in derivative contracts, with emphasis on the introduction 
of a variety of securitization devices involving redeployment of the 
public sector resources to which they have access. 
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Introduction 
This paper is concerned with how development banks might be reformed 
to be part of the wider agenda of development of the financial sector in 
the Caribbean region, including the market for commercial paper and 
bonds and the equity market. Ongoing reforms in the financial sector seek 
to improve resource flows for productive investment. Development 
banking seeks to target such resources to priority sectors that seek to use 
underemployed resources for capital accumulation and growth. The paper 
suggests steps that reconcile these objectives in a Caribbean economy. 
Method and framework of analysis 
While the analysis is intended to relate to the set of states in CARICOM, 
including Jamaica, Barbados, The Bahamas, Guyana and Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago and the countries in the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean states, a disproportionately large part of the data relates to 
Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica. This is because limitations of time, 
resources and public access to data have not allowed detailed exploration of 
materials from all territories. The same caveats apply to the coverage of 
banking institutions within Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Resources 
and access to data have allowed only a detailed analysis of representative 
cases. Nevertheless, the general analysis is based on a reasonable sample of 
cases that allow summary picture of trends with development banking in the 
CARICOM region. More important, allowance was made by convening a 
meeting of Jamaica’s sector stakeholders to provide guidelines on the nature 
of the problem and the way forward. The outcomes of this stakeholder’s 
meeting are also incorporated into the study. 
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The framework of analysis for the report is an extension of the classical multi-sectoral model 
of Lewis (1954), sufficient to embrace much of what is sound about Caribbean economic analysis 
since then. The multi-sectoral classical framework can address the two key developments evident in 
the micro data on the labour market and capital development process of Caribbean economies: 
• A labour market with large numbers of persons who are still outside the capitalist wage-
labour market and who are mainly the self-employed (without employees). These 
workers represent the principal labour potential to be put to work to build and accumulate 
capital and expand and transform the capitalist sector of the economy.  
• The development of a real capital sector – human and physical based on structural 
change to the successful use of domestic capital to make capital and the creation of 
significant externalities when domestic capital is applied in the production of capital. This 
is a fundamental development beyond the condition observed by Lewis (1954), which is 
that domestic capital can be created with little or no capital to speak of. In 2006, we can 
all agree that domestic capital is now being created with both domestic capital and labour; 
a good example being the production and use of education. The contrast with the 
traditionally dominant consumer goods (including exported intermediates) sector is clear. 
These made capital with labour alone and produced primarily by intensive use of imported 
capital. 
Indicators 
The classical multi-sectoral framework also provides a straightforward way to incorporate monetary 
expenditures into the analysis of how an economy increases its saving rate and grows. In principle, 
the classical framework interprets monetary expenditures for profit as the prime motivator and 
driver of production and change along some irregular path. In this framework, the fundamental 
consequence of the two developments above is that accumulation of domestic capital has become 
the principal means by which firms successfully increase asset turnover (interpreted as return on 
assets or the income productivity of assets) and ultimately develop the economy. This finding 
shapes the interpretation of the priority sectors and the path of development banking in this study 
and motivates the core propositions about how development banking might be successfully 
reformed in service of financial sector development. Development banks were established to 
operate primarily in Tier II mode, in the sense of direct lenders and suppliers of other 
complementary support to the final end-users of credit. Except for the regional Caribbean 
Development Bank, Tier I status refers to lending to the financial intermediaries serving end-users, 
such as commercial banks, credit unions and other financial intermediaries and has evolved over 
time, largely in response to the need for reform of the Tier II institutions. 
Related to the concern with targeting a high percentage of loans to capital-intensive activity 
in order to achieve a high asset turnover is the nexus of financial evaluation measures linked to the 
objective of viable development banking. It is intuitively reasonable to assume that viability 
requires that development financing institutions maintain a low loss rate of direct loans, especially 
since the loss rate is an integral part of the cost of providing credit. In addition, one has to be 
concerned with whether the development bank flows are providing adequate coverage of the 
intended market and whether the program is having an impact on improving the growth rate and 
economic viability of the target groups. Where data are available, such measures are considered but 
a major problem confronted by this study was lack of secondary data and lack of resources to field 
suitable primary surveys to collect relevant information. 
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Growing significance of market forces 
In the early 1980s, within the wider structural adjustment and liberalisation framework, financial 
sector reform were initiated to allow greater facility of market forces in the pricing and 
allocation of financial resources. The sector has been increasingly liberalised since then with 
subsequent on-going reform addressing the legislative and regulatory frameworks. In Trinidad and 
Tobago and Jamaica, after various significant crises attending precipitate liberalisation, recent 
reforms have focused on development of the legislative and regulatory framework for financial 
sector liberalisation (Ministry of Finance, TT, 2004; GOJ, 1994/5).1 Some of the reforms have 
targeted the development banking sector, with (i) privatisation initiatives; (ii) integration of 
institutions and internal reforms to achieve greater financial viability and less dependence on the 
state; and (iii) conversion from the founding Tier II mode to Tier I mode. Ultimately, the initiatives 
seek to promote high professional standards, efficient liquidity management and deployment and 
the orderly and efficient operation of the money and capital market, including the development of a 
corporate bond market and a variety of secondary markets such as the secondary market for loans.  
Generally, these initiatives have led to more viable Tier I enterprises but the Tier II 
development banks remain a problem, except in cases where these banks are servicing the export 
sector. Further, crucially, the reforms have not yet successfully triggered progress towards solving 
either the problem of persistent excess liquidity or the problem of very narrow and underdeveloped 
markets for corporate bonds, or secondary markets for any financial instruments. Just as crucial in 
the context of this study, neither the broad financial sector reforms nor the more targeted frequent 
reforms of development banks have solved the historical problem of inadequate and unduly 
expensive credit to priority sectors. This paper revisits the needed reforms of development banking, 
this time with priority sectors characterised by the production or intensive use of domestic capital. 
Structure of the report 
The paper will comprise 4 sections. As a way of organising stylised facts, Section I of the paper will 
briefly point to selected implications of an update of the Lewis model of development that guided 
the establishment of development banking in the Caribbean, including the Caribbean Development 
Bank established in 1970-1974. In particular, Section I will first provide an updated analysis and 
identification of the priority development sectors, in terms of the resource available and targeted for 
exploitation, the profit, savings trend and growth rates generated, and the governing relative prices 
and industrial restructuring achievable. Then, it will specify how expansion of the money supply 
through an increase in credit to the priority sectors can supplement profits as a source of working 
capital and finance for fixed capacity building to create capital and therefore create profits and 
savings at an increasing rate. The research focuses centrally on the process by which development 
banking can expand the flow of credit and other financial services for these purposes to priority 
sectors identified by public policy, and thereby facilitate capital production and accumulation and 
development in the modern Caribbean economy. 
Section II of the paper uses the framework of Section 1 to bring up to date the experience of 
development banks in the Caribbean seeking to provide specialized and subsidized financial 
services as a model for expanding the supply of financial services to underserved entities and 
targeted sectors. The particular institutions considered would include agricultural development 
banks at core, Tier I and Tier II, but the experiences of low-income mortgage banks, credit 
                                                     
1  The GOJ (1994/1995) noted that “The experience of a number of Latin American countries has shown that stabilization and 
regulatory reform must precede financial sector liberalization to avoid financial sector crisis. The importance of proper sequencing is 
underscored by the fragile nature of financial markets and potential adverse impact on real activities.” 
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cooperatives/unions and similar entities get into the picture as a source of crucial lessons. The broad 
question concerns the capacity of development banks to borrow or earn market-determined surplus 
and thus supply suitable financial services to targeted development sectors with confidence. Central 
to evaluation of this experience is the mix of working capital and capacity building financing on the 
one hand, and the targeting of the capital producing sectors on the other. Significant attention is 
therefore given to the share of credit capacity going to non-development (non-priority) sectors 
establishing import-intensive capacity, especially because such investments also imply high risk 
attached to the small scale of the activities that employ such import-intensive capacity. The quality 
of the development bank allocations would be closely related to the proportion of assets allocated to 
capital-developing (and using) sectors versus import-intensive sectors. The purpose of the section is 
to see what lessons can be learned about how reform of development banking might expand in a 
sustainable way the resource base of the financial sector and cause improved financial services to be 
provided to priority sectors. Significant attention is given to lessons learned about the optimal 
mode, Tier I or Tier II. 
In the light of the development paradigm of Section I and the lessons of history in Section II, 
Section III considers necessary reforms of development banking in a number of areas. The central 
proposition of Section III arises from the capital development focus of the priority (development) 
sectors. Specifically, it is argued that the key reforms needed must emerge from the introduction of 
derivative instruments into the financial markets that define, price and market, and hence spread, the 
significant credit risk attached primarily to provision of credit as either working capital or finance 
for fixed capacity building to create capital or to absorb it into production of consumer goods and 
services. Reforms of development banking are proposed that focus on their role as counterparty in 
derivative contracts, with emphasis on the introduction of a variety of securitization devices 
involving redeployment of the public sector resources to which they have access. Section IV 
summarises conclusions and recommendations. 
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1. Implications of an updated  
Lewis model 
Cheap labour available at a constant wage is a thing of the past in the 
Caribbean economies, accounting for no more than 10% of the Caribbean 
labour market. The fundamental means of generating rising profits, 
savings and transformational growth has now changed along with the 
available engine of growth. The first key change is to reliance on a large 
flow of externalities from investment in domestic capital,  
especially education to embody commonly available knowledge, 
development/acquisition of new/novel knowledge and the skills to use 
both forms of knowledge. The greater benefits accrue from accumulation 
of new knowledge and technologies and related skills (James, 2005). The 
second key change is to production of domestic capital with both labour 
and domestic capital, as distinct from production of domestic capital with 
labour alone as was assumed by Lewis (1954). The crucial implication of 
an updated Lewis model based on these updated assumptions is that 
development activity is now primarily the build up of the domestic capital 
component of the net assets (capital) of firms and the self-employed, and 
the related rapid increase in net asset turnover (return on assets) and 
profitability.2 The key challenge of development banking today is to 
facilitate this process. 
                                                     
2  This is the same as the accounting definition of net asset turnover. All financial indicators of profitability in relation to domestic 
capital investment are relevant. 
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Asset and value growth 
In the presence of externalities, the wage varies with the accumulation of capital and productivity 
and consumption per worker varies with the rate of growth, both typically in nonlinear relations. 
When the governing wage-price-profit-import rental functions and the governing growth-
consumption-output-imports functions are linked in this context, an important consequence relevant 
to this study is that the deterministic growth of asset value (of the firm or economy) is governed by 
a partial differential equation indicating that the non-stochastic growth of domestic capital per 
worker in the domestic economy is the primary positive influence on asset turnover and the growth 
of real gross asset value. 
The agenda of rapid growth of domestic capital has been present in the Caribbean policy 
framework since the 1950s. For example, featured in the Jamaica National Plan, 1957 (Central 
Planning Unit, 1958:46)3 the National Industrial Policy (1996/7) and its implementing policy 
frameworks are education, health, housing, infrastructure and use of “local inputs”, including the 
use of domestic output of intermediates such as oil, gas and bauxite to add value upstream in local 
production processes. One finds a similar focus in other development plans and policy frameworks 
across the Caribbean (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 1987; Ministry of Planning and 
Development, 1970; National Planning Commission, 1990; Government of St. Lucia, 1996). The 
impact of such moves has been significant, as demonstrated in macroeconomic estimates for the 
case of Suriname (Birchwood, James and San-A-Yong, 2004). Except for the case of Barbados, 
implementation has been weak. The key missing ingredients in the policy framework have generally 
been support for development of the novel capital assets and related copyright industries developed 
by the self-employed, the location of investment in infrastructure relative to the locus of innovative 
activity, the relevance and problem-solving character of the education offered at secondary and 
tertiary levels, and crucially the proper calibration of the rate of production and accumulation of 
domestic capital to grow faster than all others forms of output as well as imports of all kinds (see 
Annex I). The need for domestic capital to grow faster than other output has not been much 
appreciated by policy makers, and indicates how critical it is to use a proper and relevant policy and 
planning framework to set macroeconomic policy in a development context.  
A significant share of the problems also has to do with the failure of the financial system 
generally, and the development banks in particular, to shift credit efficiently to those sectors seeking 
to invest in domestic capital development or its intensive use. It was well-known that expansion of 
the money supply through adequate credit flows from banks to priority sectors can spur creation of 
capital with capital and related increase in the domestic capital share of the assets of firms, resulting 
in a rising capital productivity (asset turnover) and rising profitability (asset value). However, 
guided by the work of Lewis (1954), development banks were built on the rationale of supply of 
working capital to exploit low cost labour for capital creation. Cheap labour is now a thing of the 
past and the framework of evaluation of the development banks necessarily has to shift to the extent 
to which it is able to deliver a flow of credit aimed at increasing the asset turnover and asset value 
through investment to build up the share of domestic capital in the assets of firms and the economy 
as a whole.4 More important, as indicated above, neither the scale, scope and focus of the required 
credit flows nor the collaborative public policy needed for success have been properly addressed by 
the government-dominated boards of the development banks and guiding policy frameworks. 
                                                     
3  See also the 1957 edition, page 5.  
4  In that regard, it is worth observing that there is no routine monitoring of this variable at either the national or sector level. Focus 
continues to be on monitoring labour productivity. 
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Selected development consequences of credit expansion in 
modern context 
If credit is targeted to the priority sectors along the lines described above, then development is 
achieved through growth of domestic capital per worker and growth of domestic capital per unit of 
import capacity. The resulting externalities also allow growth of consumption per worker in the 
capitalist sector and among the self-employed. At the same time, the rental to imported capital and 
foreign direct investment falls and the average of the consumption rate and the import rental rate 
also falls. This allows the profit rate on domestic capital and the domestic saving rate to rise, 
thereby sustaining the transformational growth process. As long as the fall in the rental going to 
foreign direct investment is relatively greater than the growth of consumption per worker, the effect 
of the increased credit is to accelerate the investment in domestic capital per worker while total 
employment grows. There will also be a net withdrawal of labour and embodied skills from non-
capitalist uses into the capitalist sector induced by the rising capitalist wage. This condition is non-
trivial. Net withdrawal of labour and capital into the capitalist sector boosts its capitalisation, 
increases the relative concentration of skills in the sector and with that externalities and capital 
productivity – the asset turnover target to be addressed by development banking. This occurs even 
as import productivity, import capacity and imported inputs grow. If the importers are powerful 
enough to prevent this falling rate of return, then all bets on structural transformation are off. 
Otherwise, the process comes to an end only when the capitalist sector is fully transformed and the 
self-employed without employees are an insignificant share of the labour market. 
Exploitation of this development impact of credit should be the purpose of any reforms of 
development banking, with particular concern to speed up the efficient flow of credit to the self-
employed promoting use of domestic capital in order to accelerate their transformation into either 
successful capitalists or successful workers in the capitalist sector. Data below show that 
development banks have not been successful in pursuing such an agenda to date. A crucial 
challenge of any reform is to ensure effective targeting as described while lowering the cost of 
credit to the priority sectors. 
Credit and inflation 
Expanded credit financing is usually thought to have inflationary consequences and this was a 
significant concern to monetary authorities throughout the history of development banking in the 
Caribbean. The central issue has generally been the tendency for credit to cause expansion of the 
money supply at a rate above both nominal and real GDP, especially real domestic consumer 
supplies.5 The period of establishment of development banks, especially in 1968-1974, coincided 
with high inflationary pressures that were officially traced at the time to rapid expansion of credit in 
both the international and local economy. High liquidity in the local banking sector allowed banks 
to respond flexibly to the demand pressures, especially from consumers, while failing to target the 
domestic capital sector. For example, in Jamaica, local and international monetary policy treated 
inflation as a matter of priority throughout these decades, with significant focus on the restraint on 
the growth of domestic credit (Central Planning Unit, 1969:100, 102; 1970:88, 94). By 1973/1974 
policy to control credit were being introduced to complement development banking allocations as a 
critical basis for controlling inflation (National Planning Agency, 1973:5, 12-15; 1974:36). Such 
policies to use direct restraint and targeting of credit money flows to manage inflation continued 
during the oil shocks of 1973-1980 (National Planning Agency, 1976:82-84; 1977: 98-102; 1978: 
6.1, 6.6-6.8; 1979: 6.1, 6.8; 1980: 5.1 -5.3). After 1980, policy shifted with a change of government 
to restrict public sector credit while allowing the shift of most credit flows to the private sector but 
the overall emphasis of policy on restraining credit as the basis for managing inflation remained, 
                                                     
5  See for example National Planning Agency (1980), pp.5.2 and 5.3.  
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 196 New directions for development banking in the Caribbean:… 
16 
even if sometimes via the management of the balance of payments and the exchange rate (National 
Planning Agency, 1981: 6.1, 6.5-6.6; 1982:6.1; PIOJ, 1992: 5.1; 1994:5.1).  
However, in the medium term, inflation is not an inherent consequence of credit expansion to 
address modern development possibilities as set out above, especially if regulatory capacity is 
considered. If credit is used to bring the labour, tacit knowledge and skills of the self-employed into 
capitalist employment, whether as capitalist or worker, the productivity and profitability of 
consumer output grow along with the wage. So, the growth of the money supply in the hands of 
consumers (as wage earners or borrowers) does not rapidly outstrip the flow of domestic goods and 
services they can buy. Moreover, supplies of domestic capital goods will grow relatively faster than 
consumer supplies and will be continually put to use to produce both capital and consumer output 
that allow the consumption rate to rise with the flow of credit without triggering an inflationary 
spiral. The underlying reasons are: (1) the self-employed are first entrepreneurs interested in 
accumulation and in the presence of externalities would suppress consumption relatively while 
creating knowledge and capacity accordingly; and (2) if the self-employed enter the capitalist 
labour market as workers because of business failure, they would be at a substantial disadvantage in 
terms of their ability to drive up personal wages even in the presence of externalities. Slower 
growth of wages moderates the growth of demand for domestic consumer output and imports and 
keeps the growth of such output from outpacing the production of capital. Further, the growth of 
import productivity expands the supply of foreign exchange and lowers its cost while import prices 
are falling. There is no inherently strong upward inflationary pressure other than those attending 
exogenous shocks; indeed, the flow of credit itself slows incrementally over time.  
The really important underlying dynamic is the rising externalities that increase profits faster 
than prices and wage income or consumption and rapidly increases the capacity of the entrepreneurs 
to finance further capital formation (i.e., meeting both working capital and long-term capacity 
expansion) out of profits without relying on continued relative expansion of the money supply. This 
leads to a rapid convergence process that limits the demand for credit and hence the extent of 
inflation due to the expansion of credit. The rate of convergence is governed by the amount of the 
income created by use of credit that has to be shared with workers, since it is this sharing that 
governs how fast profits can grow relative to output and income. In general, the higher the profit 
share, the faster the rate of convergence. The process can also converge rapidly if development 
banking systems can use suitable devices to drive a rising share of credit to support growing 
domestic capital investment by the priority sectors.6 However, in the modern era, development 
banks would have to be designed to focus less on supply of working capital and import capacity and 
more on financing development of the domestic capital component of the asset base even as all 
forms of spending grow. 
The essential credit-flow problem 
One of the central problems of economic and social analysis in the Caribbean is the gross lack of 
adequate data, especially data on the financial sector. Nevertheless, taking into account discussions 
held with stakeholders during this study, the basic outline of the credit flow problem is that high 
risk and economic uncertainty concerning the production of domestic capital and related capital-
intensive output create substantial difficulty for such entities to demonstrate their creditworthiness 
to lenders, especially the commercial sector. Many capital-intensive producers lack significant 
experience and credit history, or have limited or highly volatile and uncertain income, even when 
involved in global trade (good or service). On the other hand, special skills and elaborate 
information systems are needed to define and evaluate loan requests because much domestic 
capital-intensive activity starts among the self-employed without employees or grows into the small 
and medium creative and copyright-intensive enterprises who have been historically ignored by the 
                                                     
6  Of course, taxes and a rising share of imports can have similar effects. 
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traditional banking sector. Many capital-intensive operators are therefore forced to use creative 
financing, such as informal venture capital, and hence operate in highly uncompetitive markets for a 
very limited flow of financing. Even Development banks have not traditionally participated in this 
sector. This has a cost in terms of high rates, a share of the value added, loss of copyright and other 
very unfavourable terms of access to limited financing.  
Relevant reforms in Development banks to make direct loans available to this sector 
facilitates the provision of credit which can help support the transition of the self-employed into the 
capitalist sector, the growth of small and medium enterprises into large ones and the adoption and 
development of new domestic and foreign capital and technologies that will make domestic capital-
intensive operations more competitive and grow at the rapid rate that is necessary in changing 
global economic conditions. That in turn would require an appropriate capacity to capture and 
spread the associated risks. The next section shows that they are not so designed. Section III shows 
what the alternative design might be. 
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2. Evolution of development 
banking 
This section reviews the nature, history and experience of development banking 
in the Caribbean. The review shows that, from the facts surrounding the 
emergence and achievements of development banking, these institutions cannot 
efficiently allocate credit to the modern priority sectors at optimal prices. 
Development banks, under government ownership and control, were forced to 
function in a manner that converted them into social-sector transfer 
mechanisms, transferring public funds to address the needs of many sectors in a 
way that offered little prospects of viability. Apart from being highly inefficient 
and financially and socially unprofitable in Tier II mode, the development 
banks were not able, unilaterally, to promote development by building up the 
domestic capital forms critical to raising the asset turnover and hence the asset 
value and viability of the target sectors. 
Reforms have moved in the direction of increasing the internal 
efficiency of the Tier II banks lending directly to the end-users of credit, 
privatisation, or establishment of Tier I banks that lend to, and on-lend through, 
the direct lenders. Tier I banking has proven to be profitable and to provide 
some stimulus to the financial sector through the flow of concessionary funds 
for lending and on-lending. However, these reforms do not address the 
fundamental challenge of moving resources efficiently to the priority sectors 
focused on domestic capital accumulation and capacity building in a context 
where the market would normally avoid exposure to their high credit risk. This 
evaluation provides the basis for designing reforms that can integrate 
development banks into the ongoing financial reform agenda. It points to the 
need to introduce strong credit risk measurement, risk pricing and hence risk 
spreading devices, ultimately by joining the global trek to establishment of 
derivatives markets. 
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Purpose 
Development banking was established to facilitate exploitation of the development resources of the 
region, at the time thought to be cheap labour, by providing direct credit and related services to 
selected priority sectors and by operating in a manner that promoted the development of the 
financial sector. Development banking exists at both the regional and national levels. 
Regional development banking 
It is useful to observe that there was always a “regional” flavour to development banking. In 
particular, there was a harmonised approach pushed by the colonial governors across the region, 
resulting in simultaneous establishment of Development Finance Corporations around 1959 to 
function as Tier II agencies in the first instance. The objective in Jamaica, reflective of objectives 
in the other countries, was to “meet the need for medium and long-term credit in certain sectors of 
the economy…” and the priority activities were “industry, housing and tourism” (Central Planning 
Unit, 1959: 52). Industry meant the “manufacturing sector” the intended principal user of cheap 
labour (Government of Jamaica, 1962).  
The regional flavour was also expressed early in the third Caribbean development decade, 
when Lewis was invited to found the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) (1970-1974) and the 
Caribbean Investment Corporation (CIC) was established as part of the Georgetown Accord. The 
mandate of the CDB was to assist its borrowing member countries to optimise the use of their 
resources, develop their economies, and expand production and trade; promote private and public 
investment, encourage the development of the financial upturn in the region, and facilitate business 
activity and expansion; mobilise financial resources from both within and outside the region for 
development; provide technical assistance to its regional borrowing members; support regional and 
local financial institutions and a regional market for credit and savings; and to support and stimulate 
the development of capital markets in the region (Table 1). The institution has evolved as an 
important “Tier I” regional lending agency lending to commercial banks, development banks or 
directly to government projects.  
The principal function of the CIC was to provide “a source of loanable funds for the 
industrial development projects of the less developed territories of CARIFTA” (National Planning 
Agency, 1973: 19).7 The CIC has proved to be a minor Tier I source of funding as could be gauged 
from its initial capital of EC$15 million. Its flexibility to respond to market forces is reflected in the 
fact that 60% of its initial capital was to be subscribed by the Regional Governments and 40% by 
the private sector. 
                                                     
7  The less developed countries were designated specifically as the OECS countries, rather than by the more usual per capita standard. 
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Table 1 
CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 
PURPOSES FUNCTIONS 
1. To contribute to the 
harmonious economic 
growth and 
development of the 
member countries in 
the Caribbean  
2. To promote economic 
co-operation and 
integration among 
them, having special 
and urgent regard to 
the needs of the less 
developed members 
of the region. 
To carry out its purposes, the CDB must:  
1. Assist regional members in the co-ordination of their development programmes with 
a view to achieving better utilization of their resources, making their economies 
more Complementary, and promoting the orderly expansion of their international 
trade, in particular intra-regional trade. 
2. Mobilize within and outside the region additional financial resources for the 
development of the region. 
3. Finance projects and programmes contributing to the development of the region or 
any of the regional members. 
4. Provide appropriate technical assistance to its regional members, particularly by 
undertaking or commissioning pre-investment surveys and by assisting in the 
identification and preparation of project proposals. 
5. Promote public and private investment in development projects by, among other 
means, aiding financial institutions in the region and supporting the establishment of 
consortia. 
6. Co-operate and assist in other regional efforts designed to promote regional and 
locally controlled financial institutions and a regional market for credit and savings. 
7. Stimulate and encourage the development of capital markets within the region. 
8. Undertake or promote such other activities as may advance its purpose. 
9. Where appropriate, co-operate with national, regional or international organizations 
or other entities concerned with the development of the region. 
Source: Agreement Establishing the CDB. 
 
National banks 
On the national scenes, the Development Finance Corporations (DFC) were found to be inadequate to 
their tasks of issuing credit and related advisory support directly to the sectors targeted by government 
and ultimately phased out. In fact, recurring commercial failure and burden on the national purse has 
been the key cause of repeated restructuring of the Tier II development banks. Generally, the historical 
focus of reforms has been on improving financial viability by introducing measures that were intended 
to improve their delivery of services and recovery of assets. This has meant initiatives such as the 
merging of various institutions to achieve scale-related benefits; more stringent monitoring and 
supervision of loans to achieve better capital adequacy; asset quality; liquidity; earnings and growth as 
well as to improve collections on loans outstanding and interest due. The central solution was 
establishment of at least one development bank in each territory by 1980. 
In Belize, the Development Finance Corporation was established in 1963. The Grenada 
Agricultural Bank was established in 1965 and St. Kitts and Nevis created the Development Finance 
Corporation in 1968. The Bahamas created the Bahamian Development Bank in 1974 by legislation 
but it became operational in 1978. 
In historical terms, following the early formation of the development banks, there was 
repeated rationalisation of some of these entities as part of the wider structural adjustment 
programme of the 1980s, particularly as it was recognised that these banks were a drain on the 
national treasury. In Grenada, the Grenada Agriculture Bank became the Grenada Agriculture and 
Industrial Development Corporation and subsequently the Grenada Development Bank in 1980. In 
St. Kitts and Nevis, the Development and Finance Corporation was succeeded by the Development 
Bank of St. Kitts and Nevis in 1981. Similarly in Jamaica, the National Development Bank of 
Jamaica Limited and the Agricultural Credit Bank of Jamaica were merged in 2000 to become the 
Development Bank of Jamaica Limited. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, the Industrial 
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Development Corporation was closed and private interests were brought into the Development 
Finance Corporation and the institution was renamed as Development Finance Limited. In all cases, 
the move was intended to shift the burden of the banks from the national budget. The specifics from 
the two largest economies are instructive. 
Jamaica 
In the case of Jamaica, a new institution, the Jamaica Development Bank (JDB) was established in 
1969 to “provide the type of assistance required to facilitate the establishment and operation of 
“development enterprises” identified in the Jamaica Development Bank Act, 1969 specifically as 
“industrial, tourist, housing, and commercial agricultural enterprises.” The JDB was established 
with a subsidiary, the Small Industry Development Finance Company (SIFCO), set up for the 
purpose of targeting small enterprise. The services envisaged included “direct loans, loans with 
equity participation, the underwriting of securities, guarantees, and the provision of financial advice 
to potential as well as existing clients” (Central Planning Unit, 1969:113). From the start, the 
commitment to support the development of the financial sector was explicit. For example, the Act 
specifically charged the JDB with responsibility to “assist persons in establishing, carrying on, or 
expanding development enterprises by participating in share capital, granting loans, and providing 
other forms of financial assistance,” and crucially to “foster the development of money and capital 
markets” (Jamaica Development Bank Act, 1969: s 4.1; Central Planning Unit, 1970:103). It should 
be noted that notwithstanding the presence of discretionary powers to “furnish financial advice and 
provide or assist in obtaining managerial, technical, and administrative services for development 
enterprises in Jamaica,” these extension activities were not viewed as a mandate and were not given 
priority focus in the general scheme partly because of limited capacity to deliver on the part of the 
development banks. 
By 1981, policy makers in Jamaica formed the view that the JDB and SIFCO were not 
operating as a viable Tier II financial institution, especially in the context of large-scale lending to 
government, and in particular had lost the ability to raise finance on the international markets. 
These institutions were therefore replaced in 1981/1982 by the National Development Bank (NDB) 
and the Agricultural Credit Bank (AC Bank), designed to operate as Tier I national institutions on 
a new principle of direct lending only to commercial banks and approved financial institutions. 
For example, the AC Bank took over lending to agriculture from the pre-existing Agricultural 
Credit Board and was expected to “be run as a viable enterprise … to provide credit to farmers on a 
timely, cost-effective and relevant basis.” The AC Bank was designed to “operate as a wholesaler of 
credit” and to “on-lend funds to commercial banks and approved institutions such as the People’s 
Cooperative Banks and Cooperatives” that in turn operated as the Tier II institutions designed to 
“retail credit to farmers and … bear the risk of the loans”. The NDB took over the assets of the JDB 
and SIFCO, with the mandate to “only offer loans to commercial banks and approved financial 
institutions.” The intent in both cases was to minimise credit risk, so that the institutions could 
lower interest spread and enable commercial banks and approved institutions to lend to their 
customers with minimal increases in the interest rate charged to the borrower. At the same time, the 
NDB was required to operate “a special facility for small business to give advice to prospective 
borrowers on finance and project implementation …” The purpose here was primarily to assist them 
in approaching commercial banks and financial institutions (National Planning Agency, 1982: 
6.17). The most recent reforms to address viability have led to formation of the Development Bank 
of Jamaica (DBJ) to provide both Tier I and Tier II lending services.  
Important elements of the regional development banking landscape are the Jamaica Students’ 
Loan Bureau and the highly successful National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica Ltd (EX-IM 
Bank). It is interesting in the light of the proposals advance later in this study, that the EX-IM bank 
was established in 1986 to take over and execute the functions of the Jamaica Export Credit 
Insurance Corporation, which had not performed up to expectations with respect to the provision of 
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trade financing and export credit insurance as well as to support businesses involved in import 
substitution. The Jamaican Students’ Loan Bureau was established in 1996 in an overarching reform 
of previous loan arrangements to facilitate increasing cost-sharing by the private sector in a context 
of tightening budget constraints (World Bank, 1996).8  
Trinidad and Tobago 
In Trinidad and Tobago, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was formed as early as 
1959, and this was later followed by upgrading or establishment by 1968 of other development 
agencies including the Development Finance Corporation and the Export Development Corporation 
and the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB).9 The institutions were designed as Tier II lending 
institutions came out of recognition by government that the credit needs and supporting extension 
requirements of the industrial and agricultural sector were not being adequately met. The IDC was 
ultimately closed because it core objectives of stimulating long run industrialisation on an import-
substitution base were not being achieved.   
The ADB has survived, but has not been effective. When established, its objective was to 
encourage and foster the development of agriculture and commercial fishing and industries 
connected therewith and to mobilize funds for the purpose of such development. The ADB 
committed to investment in plant and equipment needs, working capital, construction and 
infrastructure works, raw materials and related activities and other inputs of importance to its client 
base. As we shall see, its loan portfolios and financial performance also tell a story of general 
failure to achieve its goals while operating in Tier II mode and subject to public sector directives. 
Reforms over the years included the end of government subsidies by 1985; radical upgrading of the 
internal operations by 1993, with the technical assistance of the IADB to address perceived 
organizational and operational deficiencies, strategic planning, loan evaluation and management 
practices, strategies to address (sell) bad loans and other related internal matters (ADB, Annual 
Reports, various years).  
The DFC in Trinidad and Tobago was itself reformed and privatised, converted into the 
Development Finance Limited (DFL) and ultimately redesigned to provide both Tier I and Tier II 
services to meet the needs of manufacturing, tourism and the industrial and commercial services in 
Trinidad and Tobago and the Eastern Caribbean. Of significance in this context, the reformed 
institution finances plant and equipment needs, working capital, construction and infrastructure 
works, raw materials and related activities and advertises its interest in promoting investment in the 
capital sectors of health, education and professional services (www.dflcaribbean.com).  
Ownership and governance of national development banks 
Development banks have generally been established as government-owned or controlled 
institutions. With the exception of DFL, privatisation and in particular private control is not 
characteristic of the sector and in the few cases on record largely evolved from concern with 
solvency and the continued burden of accumulated losses on the public purse (Table 2). This also 
applies to the CDB. In the case of the CDB, the public ownership structure is defined to include 
international non-regional members who in turn afford opportunity for the World Bank and the 
British Department for International Development to participate (Table 3). 
Placed in the context of the lack of transparency of national governance arrangements, the 
absence of sector-wide approaches and joint decision-making processes that bring all hands on 
board to define national policy and also the absence of public expenditure review mechanisms that 
is characteristic of governance and public sector budgeting in the Caribbean, public ownership has 
                                                     
8  World Bank (1996). Staff Appraisal Report: Jamaica’s Student Loan Project. Report No. 15594-JM, Country Department III, Human 
and Social Development Group, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Washington D.C: The World Bank. 
9  Established by the Agricultural Development Bank Act, 1968. 
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meant that development banks have largely responded to public policy directives rather than private 
market signals. Throughout its history therefore, as a direct consequence of predominantly public 
ownership, the development banking sector has featured little overall flexibility to adjust policy 
perspectives and respond to market signals even when forced to operate without government 
subventions. Nevertheless, as in the case of the CDB and the EXIM Bank of Jamaica, public 
ownership has served to demonstrate the overall financial strength that collaborative ownership can 
achieve were development banks to be further reformed to upgrade their roles in collateralising and 
securing lines of credit to commercial entities and development entities in the private sector. 
Table 2 
STATE OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPMENT BANKS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
Development Bank/Financing Institutions Ownership 
The Bahamian Development Bank (Bahamas) State 
The Development Finance Corporation /Farmer’s Bank (Belize) State 
The Grenada Agricultural Bank (Grenada)  State 
Development Finance Corporation (St Kitts/Nevis)  State 
Jamaica  
Jamaica Development Bank/SIFCO/Agricultural Credit Banks State 
National Investment Bank of Jamaica/National Development 
Bank/Development Bank of Jamaica 
State 
Students’ Loan Bureau State 
Trinidad and Tobago  
Industrial Development Corporation / Agricultural Development Bank State 
Development Finance Limited Private Sector; Minority State 
 
Table 3 
CDB OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE WITH REPRESENTATION 
Membership type Member states 
Regional  Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,  British 
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands (In all cases through the 
Ministry of Finance) 
Other Regional  Colombia (Bank of the Republic), Mexico (Ministry of Finance), Venezuela 
(Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank) 
Non - Regional Canada (Canadian High Commission), China (Peoples’ Bank of China), 
Germany (World Bank), Italy (Ministry of Economy and Finance), United 
Kingdom (Department for International Development) 
Source: CDB Website www.caribank.org 
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Sources of funds – regional and national patterns 
Government and international agencies are the main sources of concessionary funds for 
development banking in the Caribbean. The CDB is becoming an increasingly important medium 
through which the national banks receive international concessionary funding. 
In the case of the CDB, concessionary funding comes from its Ordinary Capital Resources 
(OCR), its Special Development Funds and Other Special Funds. The OCR comprises borrowing 
from the private capital markets (regional and international) and from international financial 
institutions, paid up capital by member countries and a risk cover built up from accumulated 
retained earnings. By achieving AAA rating status, the CDB has built up a significant capacity to 
finance concessionary lending by borrowing from the international capital markets at very 
reasonable rates varying widely between 3% and 6% depending on source. The main assets 
generating a substantial flow of retained earnings are the high-performance loans to member 
countries (http://www.caribank.org/BOG2005.nsf/AR-2005?OpenPage – Annual Report 2005). 
The DFL of Trinidad and Tobago stands out as a privately owned and financed bank that 
maintains its development orientation. Its main sources of funds are the local, regional and 
international capital markets as well as its own cash flows and profits (www.dflcaribbean.com).  
With respect to the other national development banks in the region, in the inception period 
from the 1950s to 1979, government transfers were the main source of financing, including funds to 
cover bad debts. There was also significant funding from international sources via the CDB and 
other multilateral agencies such as the IDB and the European Development Funds tied to the Lome 
convention. As Development banks have been moved increasingly to Tier I status, there has also 
been a shift by government to use of loan arrangements as the mode of financing. Since 2000, long-
term loans have formed the major source of funds for the development banks in the region. The 
proportion of long-term loans to assets for the sample of development banks examined for the 
period 2002 to 2004 was over 44 per cent, with four of the seven banks recording a ratio between 
50 to 70 per cent, see Table 4. Sixteen years earlier, i.e., in 1986, the banks accessed a slightly 
lower proportion of long-term finance. The loans to assets ratio was under 65 per cent for four of 
the five banks examined for that period. Note however, that reliance on long term loans did not 
necessarily mean the end of heavy dependence on the state since much depends on how unpaid debt 
to the state are managed.10 The major sources of long-term loans were government, local agencies, 
the Caribbean Development Bank and the Multilateral Banks such as the IDB, European 
Development Agencies, American Development Agencies and commercial banks in the region. 
Development banks in Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were able to raise funds by 
floating government backed bonds. In addition, development banks in the Belize and the OECS 
countries were able to adopt the controversial and socially high-cost practice of borrowing from 
their national security schemes while some development banks obtained loans directly from the 
Central Bank. Borrowing from the national security scheme is currently being considered for 
adoption in Jamaica. 
                                                     
10  It is perhaps too early to assess how this mechanism would work if the Tier I institutions get into financial trouble. 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 196 New directions for development banking in the Caribbean:… 
26 
Table 4 





























1986 36.9% 47.1% 64.8% NA 63.1% 88.6% NA 
2002-2004 44.2% 64.7% 50.8% 64.1% 108.5% 91.3% 68.0% 
Source: Annual Reports of the various development banks. 
 
Management capacity of development banks 
The weak asset base and dependence on the government budget has been highly consequential. The 
technical capacities of the development banks tend to be within the normal range of the local public 
sector, and on average as well or better educated than the private sector. However, the institutions 
have generally lacked entrepreneurial drive. Especially in their Tier II functions, they have been 
unduly inflexible in evolving suitable autonomy in loan award decision making and flexibility to 
address the needs of private investors (as distinct from government). We return to this in evaluating 
performance. Both discussions with the stakeholders and several confidential reports prepared by 
reputable international agencies11 have indicated that the absence of adequate room to practice 
entrepreneurship as indicated by factors such as too many control point in loan processing that 
result in delays in loan approvals, uninformed limitations on the size and quality of loans with 
respect to capital-intensive sectors, inadequate focus on marketing, advertising and research as well 
as absence of independence and autonomy in shaping policy because of government’s dominance of 
the boards. 
This is not only due to the restraints imposed by publicly controlled boards, but also the lack of 
room to invest in developing high quality staff trained in finance and the development of suitable 
instruments to address credit risk. This has been a significant constraint on the development of the 
finance-related capacity of the sector and its ability to lead development in the financial sector as well 
as the technical and related political credibility to lead the public sector in development financing 
matters. Many governments are under very tight budgetary constraints as budget deficits have been 
growing absolutely (Table 5) and as a share of GDP (Table 6), restricting flexibility to meet the needs 
of the development banks for large-scale low-cost funds to meet the demands of customers. In some 
case, such as Belize and Jamaica, the growth of the deficit has been very large, more than doubling in 
each year in the context of related inflation, and only Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago 
have met the desired CARICOM average target in terms of share of GDP (3%). Correspondingly, the 
institutions have lacked the required novelty in the reading of, and responding to, the emerging market 
trends and signals; and have been excessively vulnerable to political interference and directives and to 
corrupt influences. Indeed, for these reasons, they have also become excessively burdened by the 
bureaucratic approaches to administration, even after repeated reforms and have lacked both the 
autonomy and the will to design suitable methods of defining and addressing credit risk. 
                                                     
11  Some of these reports were examined for reporting in this study but without permission to quote. 
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Table 5 
CARICOM: OVERALL FISCAL BALANCES (MILLIONS, NATIONAL CURRENCIES)  
AND GROWTH OF DEFICITS, 1996-2003 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average 
1996-2003 
Bahamas  -63.5 -135.5 -80.4 -51.4 -14.3 -95.3 -134.3 -207.6   
Deficit Growth 
Bahamas  
  113% -41% -36% -72% 566% 41% 55% 89% 
Barbados  -128.4 -39.0 -39.2 -117.2 -78.2 -182.0 -316.3 -164.8   
Deficit Growth 
Barbados  
  -70% 1% 199% -33% 133% 74% -48% 36% 
Belize  -4.6 -25.3 -28.6 -29.1 -139.9 -142.4 -68.8 -212.9   
Deficit Growth 
Belize  
  450% 0.1 2% 3.8 2% -0.5 209% 144% 
EC Currency 
Union  
-107.9 -170.9 -325.4 -215.5 -337.0 -555.7 -698.9 -414.8   
Deficit Growth 
ECCU 
  58% 90% -34% 56% 65% 26% -41% 32% 
Guyana -1,587.2 -7,403.7 -7,317.3 -2,431.1 -9,478.7 -12,790.1 -9,869.7 -9,547.2   
Deficit Growth 
Guyana  
  366% -1% -67% 290% 35% -23% -3% 85% 
Jamaica  -11,013.0 -18,742.3 -13,140.2 -12,140.0 -2,684.9 -20,945.5 -32,342.8 -42,631.6   
Deficit Growth 
Jamaica  
  70% -30% -8% -78% 680% 54% 32% 103% 
Suriname  -6,262.0 -10,499.0 -43,200.0 -73,000.0 -142,765.0 52,900.0 -157,400.0 6,700.0   
Deficit Growth 
Suriname 
  68% 311% 69% 96% -137% -398% -104% -14% 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
171.0 41.4 -741.0 -1,355.3 819.1 -40.6 186.8 1,835.0   
Growth Trinidad 
and Tobago 
  -0.76 -18.90 0.83 -1.60 -1.05 -5.60 8.82 -261% 
 
Table 6 
OVERALL FISCAL BALANCES AS % OF GDP, 1996-2003 
Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average 
Bahamas -0.9 -3.4 -1.9 -1.1 -0.3 -1.9 -2.7 -4.1 -2.0 
Barbados -3.2 -0.9 -0.8 -2.3 -1.5 -3.6 -6.3 -3.1 -2.7 
Belize -0.4 -2.0 -2.3 -2.1 -9.0 -8.8 -4.9 -10.8 -5.0 
EC 
Currency 
Union -1.7 -2.6 -4.6 -5.8 -7.6 -10.1 -11.6 -8.5 -6.6 
Guyana -1.6 -6.9 -6.8 -2.0 -7.3 -9.6 -7.1 -6.6 -6.0 
Jamaica  -4.9 -7.6 -5.0 -4.3 -0.8 -6.0 -8.5 -9.8 -5.9 
Suriname -2.0 -3.0 -9.7 -9.6 -12.2 3.2 -7.0 0.2 -5.0 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 0.5 0.1 -1.9 -3.2 1.6 -0.1 0.3 2.7 0.0 
TARGET -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 3.0 
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Development banks - a performance evaluation 
Credit allocation  
The crucial challenge of development today is to achieve rapid accumulation of domestic capital as 
the basis for achieving rapid growth of asset turnover. So, in terms of sectoral allocation, the key 
test for development banks is whether they are able to flexibly allocate resources to the sectors that 
are achieving the highest asset turnover through these means. This requires an increasing allocation 
to sectors that use domestic capital intensively, including those that make intensive use of copyright 
to earn income. 
Allocations of the CDB 
Provision of lines of credit to the national development institutions is CDB’s main method of 
supporting the CARICOM development agenda,12 so a reasonable assessment of the institutions 
allocation of resources is achieved by examining the allocation patterns of these beneficiary 
institutions across the region. 
The general regional pattern 
There was a sharp contrast between the credit allocation of development banks in Belize along with 
the OECS islands, compared with the rest of the member territories of CARICOM, see Table 7. 
Housing was the dominant sector which received loans by the development banks in Belize and 
most of the OECS islands in the sample. In addition these banks also provided credit for other 
human resource development through student loans. The allocation to human capital development is 
consistent with development needs but the failure to adopt a reasonable market-driven business 
model in the process has led to significant problems of viability in the case of Belize.  
The pattern is different for the other territories, as loans to industry featured in the lending of 
those development banks. Interestingly, the development bank in Jamaica allocated about half of its 
loan portfolio to government. Conventional interpretation would suggest that there was some level 
of crowding out of private sector loans by this development bank while government gained low cost 
loans. A more useful interpretation is perhaps that this, like the problems with the high allocation to 
housing in Belize, are manifestations of the inherent conflict that exists between government-
ownership and control under non-transparent governance arrangements and the need for the 
ownership of Development banks to rationalised and privatised to respond adequately to market 
signals in what are increasingly market driven CARICOM economies. 
In terms of the productive sectors, the evidence suggests that the allocations of the national 
development banks are mainly to the traditional manufacturing and agricultural sectors that do not 
have a significant share of domestic capital in their net assets and that are not focused on accumulating 
such capital assets. This is illustrated for the cases of Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. Services and 
tourism, which are relatively more capital intensive and are the key growth sectors of the economy, 
tend to receive a stable rather than growing share of development credit. This is well illustrated by the 
Jamaica case data, with allocations of about 60% to its manufacturing sector and 20% to services and 
tourism (Table 8). Indeed, within the agricultural sector, most of the loan funds went to sugar, coffee 
and other sectors that make intensive use of imported capital, even if not modern form of such capital 
(Table 9). These sectors are typically selected by government, often for an underlying social policy 
purpose, but not inherently linked to high current or potential productivity, profitability and savings, as 
dictated by the changing development conditions.  
                                                     
12  This is the CDB’s description of its record. See for example, The Caribbean Development Banks Operations in 2005 on 
http://www.caribank.org/BOG2005.nsf/AR-2005?OpenPage. 
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This pattern of allocation is mainly because throughout their tenure development banks 
inherently lacked both the flexibility to address the needs of all aspects of the private sector (as distinct 
from government), as indicated by market forces,13 and the autonomy in loan award decision making to 
meet such a challenge. The banks tend to operate with a very low debt ratio,14 relying mainly on 
government funding to meet commitments and address insolvency. In the absence of strong 
complementary joint decision-making processes that give the private sector a firm role in national or 
local government budgeting, the banks are mainly dominated by government’s reading of development 
needs and are ill-placed to define their roles in terms of market signals about development needs. The 
issue here is not management skills. Development banks are generally run by persons with comparable 
technical skills to those in the private sector. However, even with high-quality management capacity, 
the banks are generally subject to excessive political interference that results in an inadequate role for 
asset turnover and commercial viability when making allocation choices. 
Corresponding to an inadequate focus on meeting the domestic capital growth needs of the 
private sector is an excessive share of short-term loans (working capital supports) in their asset structure 
and an inadequate focus on viable long terms loans. The data is not frequently published but when 
available, such as for the ADB in Trinidad and Tobago, the indicator is that there is excessive focus on 
both working capital needs and on foreign capital inputs. In 1993 and 1994 at least 70% of the input 
costs financed went to working capital and foreign inputs15 in a context in which the prospects for 
increasing viability were increasingly to be found in investment in domestic capital (Table 10). And in 
2001, 8 years after the initiation of the aforementioned reforms in 1993, there was neither a focus on 
domestic capital development nor on use of interest differentials to promote investment in its various 
forms. The Ministry of Food Production and Marine Resources (2001) in its review of sector policy, 
had to lament that investment in the most important input, new local knowledge and skills, was 
inadequate: “The concern is that the education and training system is not providing the knowledge and 
skills necessary for the development of the agricultural sector” (p.20).16  
Equally compelling evidence exists that there was insignificant capital accumulation through 
acquisition and development of land, a main form of capital accumulation and rising asset turnover 
under the current agricultural technology. More than 36 years after the establishment of the ADB in 
Trinidad and Tobago, the data from the Agricultural Census of 2004 showed that 87% of all farmers 
hold less than five hectares of land. These are clearly insufficient lands to address seriously the issue of 
asset turnover and underwrite the growing viability of the clients of the institution. The associated 
degree of inequality is high, as indicated by a Theil index of the inequality of land distribution of 0.52. 
That is to say, the inequality-adjusted average level of land holdings is about 52% below what would be 
desirable if the society was interested in consolidating and capitalising agricultural acreages equitably in 
the hands of those who are concerned with successful farming as a livelihood. It could hardly be 
reasonable to expect that under such circumstances the majority of the clients of the development banks, 
tiny farms and small operators, could support increasing viability of the institutions (Table 11). The 
failure to target capital accumulation helps to explain why in 1994 only 2.0% of allocations went 
towards financing land acquisition and development (Table 10). 
                                                     
13  That is to say as indicated by the rankings of (industry performance) indicators such as asset turnover or capital productivity or 
profitability in the market. 
14  That is, a low debt to total assets ratio. 
15  Estimates exclude installation and maintenance. 
16  This evaluation did not reflect full appreciation of the changing market conditions. The same report interpreted the impact of rising 
productivity and wage reservations as “Dutch Disease” in Trinidad and Tobago, rather than as the consequence of inadequate 
domestic capitalisation that had the effect of inhibiting the growth of capital and import productivity, i.e., asset turnover, in 
agriculture and related industries such as tourism. This illustrates how important it is that policy-makers addressing development 
issues be guided by sound microeconomic data analysis and related appropriate macroeconomics. 
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Table 7 
LEADING TWO SECTORS RECEIVING LOANS FROM SELECTED DEVELOPMENT BANKS (2002-2004) 
 Development Banks in the OECS Other CARICOM Development Banks 
 Grenada 
Development Bank 
(% of total loans) 
Development Bank 
of St. Kitts and 
Nevis  
(% of total loans) 
Bank of St. Lucia 
Limited  
(% of total loans) 
Development Bank 
of Belize  




(% of total loans) 
Development Bank 
of Jamaica  
(% of total loans) 
Services     44.4  
Fishing     19.6  
Government      47.5 
Loans to Financial 
and Agricultural 
Institutions 
     31.6 
Housing 
Development 
14.0 96.7 46.0 41.4   
General  2.5     
Student loans 66.7  25.0    
Micro Enterprises    24.5   
Source: Annual Reports of the respective development banks. 
 
Table 8 




























1969 0.725 2.3  0.825   0.60 4.5 51.7% 18.5% 
1970 0.725 3.2  1.2   0.04 5.2 62.0% 23.3% 
2001 377.6 2338.3 322.3 471.7 59.6 308.8 2.30 3880.6 60.3% 20.5% 
2002 252.7 2364.4 382.2 357.9 56 43.7 2.50 3459.4 68.3% 21.4% 
2003 261.8 2266.9 569.4 128.6 436.7 5.4 0.00 3668.8 61.8% 19.0% 
Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica, various years. 
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Table 9 
ADB DISBURSEMENT OF LOANS BY SECTOR 
 1993 1994 1995 
Sector Total ($'000) % of Total Total ($'000) % of Total Total ($'000) % of Total 
Cereals 1 020.2 1.44% 1 887.6 5.00% 375.0 0.67% 
Roots & Starches 671.1 0.94% 472.7 1.25% 375.0 0.67% 
Vegetables 3 015.7 4.25% 2 187.9 5.79% 2 250.0 4.00% 
Pulses & Nuts 5.4 0.01% 2.7 0.01% 37.5 0.07% 
Fruits 602.0 0.85% 371.0 0.98% 900.0 1.60% 
Cocoa & Coffee 721.7 1.02% 576.6 1.53% 1 875.0 3.33% 
Sugar Cane 7 347.0 10.34% 6 549.8 17.35% 7 875.0 14.00% 
Condiments 492.4 0.69% 3.5 0.01% 75.0 0.13% 
Other Crops 10.0 0.01% 50.1 0.13% 225.0 0.40% 
Plant Propogation 17.0 0.02% 7.0 0.02% 150.0 0.27% 
Poultry 1 636.4 2.30% 1 178.3 3.12% 900.0 1.60% 
Dairy 644.0 0.91% 661.1 1.75% 600.0 1.07% 
Beef 19.7 0.03% 40.4 0.11% 187.5 0.33% 
Pigs 114.6 0.16% 137.8 0.36% 337.5 0.60% 
Sheep & Goats 110.3 0.16% 223.9 0.59% 150.0 0.27% 
Other Livestock 0.0 0.00% 0.0 0.00% 75.0 0.13% 
Bees 85.5 0.12% 89.9 0.24% 75.0 0.13% 
Forestry 159.0 0.22% 52.5 0.14% 3 000.0 5.33% 
Fish 2 051.4 2.89% 1 399.2 3.71% 1 500.0 2.67% 
Aquaculture 79.9 0.11% 2.0 0.01% 750.0 1.33% 
Agro-Industry 48 799.0 68.71% 19 121.5 50.64% 30 000.0 53.33% 
A.C.S. 74.2 0.10% 95.0 0.25% 187.5 0.33% 
Ornamental Horticulture 1 889.8 2.66% 1 787.6 4.73% 3 000.0 5.33% 
Marketing 251.6 0.35% 84.9 0.22% 1 350.0 2.40% 
Mechanical Services 301.2 0.42% 643.2 1.70% 0.0 0.00% 
Agri-Bus. Input Sup. 63.0 0.09% 0.0 0.00% 0.0 0.00% 
Service Charge 745.7 1.05% 0.0 0.00% 0.0 0.00% 
Other Income 93.7 0.13% 130.7 0.35% 0.0 0.00% 
TOTAL 71 021.5 100.00% 37 756.9 100.00% 56 250.0 100.00% 
Source: Agricultural Development Bank, Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Table 10 
ADB LOANS DISBURSED BY INPUT PURPOSE 
 1993 1994 





Pirogues, Engines, Nets 817.4 1.34% 1492.1 2.4% 
Trawlers, M.P. Boats, Equipment 602.8 0.99% 180.0 0.3% 
Farm Machinery & Equipment 2666.1 4.38% 3938.8 6.3% 
Farm Vehicles 1167.0 1.92% 2533.3 4.1% 
Farm Buildings 2823.7 4.64% 359.4 0.6% 
Infrastructure 1074.6 1.76% 337.4 0.5% 
Land Acquisition 196.5 0.32% 888.6 1.4% 
Purchase Of Stock 649.7 1.07% 924.3 1.5% 
Establishment 2172.8 3.57% 1984.6 3.2% 
Op. Costs re Primary Production 2404.3 3.95% 1211.4 1.9% 
Rehabilitation 67.0 0.11% 123.8 0.2% 
Plant Machinery & Equipment 7845.4 12.88% 8787.2 14.1% 
Factory Buildings 76.8 0.13% 2058.1 3.3% 
Working Capital re Agro Industry 27830.3 45.70% 24790.9 39.8% 
Farm Dwelling House 345.2 0.57% 452.0 0.7% 
Establishment / Maintenance 3326.8 5.46% 2321.7 3.7% 
Maintenance 5428.5 8.91% 6935.8 11.1% 
Rehabilitation / Maintenance 10.0 0.02% 34.2 0.1% 
Transfer of ADB Loan 764.3 1.26% 1345.6 2.2% 
Draught Animal 3.0 0.00% 0.0 0.0% 
Re-lending 44.2 0.07% 64.0 0.1% 
Harvesting 49.0 0.08% 26.5 0.0% 
Transport-Market 14.2 0.02% 50.3 0.1% 
Contingency 2.0 0.00% 217.4 0.3% 
Insurance 2.2 0.00% 164.3 0.3% 
Liquidation of Non ADB Loan (SLDF) 380.8 0.63% 94.4 0.2% 
Marketing 0.0 0.00% 194.0 0.3% 
Service Charge 129.9 0.21% 765.9 1.2% 
TOTAL 60894.5 100.00% 62276.0 100.0% 
Total Working Capital and Imported Inputs 44937.30 73.8% 46986.00 75.4% 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Planning Division. 
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Table 11 
FARM LAND DISTRIBUTION IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, 2004 



























<0.5 4166 0.2196 0.25 1041.50 0.014 0.14 -1.95 -0.28 
0.5-<1 2438 0.1285 0.75 1828.50 0.025 0.25 -1.39 -0.35 
1-<2 3453 0.1820 1.50 5179.50 0.071 0.71 -0.35 -0.25 
2-<5 6464 0.3408 3.50 22624.00 0.309 3.09 1.13 3.48 
5-<10 1693 0.0893 7.50 12697.50 0.173 1.73 0.55 0.95 
10-<50 699 0.0369 30.00 20970.00 0.286 2.86 1.05 3.01 
50-<100 30 0.0016 75.00 2250.00 0.031 0.31 -1.18 -0.36 
100-<200 14 0.0007 150.00 2100.00 0.029 0.29 -1.25 -0.36 
200-<500 9 0.0005 350.00 3150.00 0.043 0.43 -0.84 -0.36 
500+ 2 0.0001 700.00 1400.00 0.019 0.19 -1.65 -0.32 
 18968 1.0000  73241.00 1.00   0.52 
Source: Agricultural Census 2004 as reported in ADB Strategic Plan, 2005-2007. 
 
Credit expansion 
There are significant differences among Development banks with respect to the intensity of long 
term loans in their asset portfolio. As noted above, at the regional level, the main assets generating a 
substantial flow of retained earnings are the high-performance loans to member countries 
(http://www.caribank.org/BOG2005.nsf/AR-2005?OpenPage – Annual Report 2005). For the DFL, 
also an institution with a high performance rating, loans are also the major assets driving sound 
cash-flow and retained earnings performance (www.dflcaribbean.com). 
With respect to the national development banks, examination of the sample of development 
banks in Table 12 reveals that long term loans accounted for less than 60 per cent of the assets of 
four out of the seven development banks in the sample. However, the loan concentration ranged 
between 73 per cent and 90 per cent for the other three banks.  Regarding the loans to debt ratio, the 
Development Bank of Jamaica, which now operates primarily as a Tier I institution or direct lender 
to government exhibited the best indicators, with loans more that 13% above debts.17 Except for the 
Bahamas Development Bank, other Development banks operated with loans to debt ratios that are 
significantly below 100% and therefore a matter of considerable concern.  
The significant differences between the ratio of long term loans to assets as well as debt 
reflected: (1) differences in the liquidity preferences of development banks, (2) differences in credit 
demand, (3) differences in the diversification by development banks in other activities and very 
likely, (4) differences in the quality of loans disbursed under the influence of politically oriented 
boards. For example, in the sample, the Agricultural Development Bank in Trinidad and Tobago 
exercised the greatest preference for liquidity in the sample, as this entity held about 36 per cent of 
its assets in financial instruments, thus suggesting supply or demand constraints in the credit 
market. However, under the influence of public policy, two of the other development banks 
diversified their activities into the real estate market. In 2002, the Development Finance 
Corporation (Belize) held 24 per cent of its assets in speculative real estate activities including 
housing projects that have generally been non-performing. The development bank of St. Kitts and 
Nevis held 39 per cent of its assets in 2004 in the form of equity in the manufacturing sector and 
other activities. 
                                                     
17  It is not clear how much this indicator is influenced by the high rate of lending to government. 
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Table 12 


























Loans to assets 7.8% 72.8% 42.1% 56.4% 86.8% 90.4% 58.3% 
Loans to debt 17.5% 112.6% 82.8% 88.0% 79.9% 99.0% 85.7% 
Development 
banks Loans to 
Commercial 
Bank Loans 
 22.8%    1.1% 2.0% 
Source: calculated from annual reports of the respective development banks and the monthly and annual statistical digest 
of the commercial banks. 
 
Default risk 
The loan default risk observed in the local development banks is a function of the intrinsic risk 
associated with borrower type, the level of credit rationing practised by the banks, the willingness 
of borrowers to repay and the strength of  the loans collections department. Regarding borrower 
type, the failure to focus on allocation for accumulation of domestic capital to increase asset 
turnover tends to cause a low asset turnover by the development banks and a high failure rate 
among its clients as indicated by the high rate of bad-debt provisions in its assets and high 
accumulated losses. In particular, the lack of viability resulting from inadequate focus on the 
development of domestic capital is reflected in a high proportion of investment going to 
uncompetitive activity and hence to a high proportion of non-performing loans, notwithstanding 
repeated reform of the practices of development banking institutions.18 
The differences in the accounting practices between development banks made comparisons 
difficult with regards to the severity of loan default. For example, while one development bank in 
the sample reported actual non-performing loans of 43.8% of portfolio, the others reported 
provision for loan losses as low as 1.6% of portfolio (Table 13). Moreover, the basis of the 
provisions was not clear and it appears to vary among the banks. In particular, it is not clear whether 
the provisions were made before or after substantial write-offs by government. Nevertheless, the 
figures given by the development banks can serve as a useful guide since they at least give an idea 
that the problem of non-performing loans ranges from severe to moderate across the region, even 
after taking account of how political expediency influences reporting standards. Indeed, 
development banks went through restructuring and consolidation in the structural adjustment period 
since 1979, mainly because earlier versions of the banks reflected high proportions of non-
performing loans (essentially defaults). The data presented in Table 13 relates to the period after the 
reforms of the entities. So the idea that the problem of significant non-performing loans has again 
arisen since these reforms indicate existence of significant underlying problems with the current 
principles of development banking. A significant contributor to the problem of default risk is the 
absence of a strong regional debt collection mechanism with adequate international affiliation 
operating in the wider Caribbean region. 
Most of the development banks in the sample did not set aside a large proportion of total 
loans to cover loan defaults. In analysing those where the risk of loan default appears to be low, 
certain features stand out. The Agriculture Development Bank of Trinidad and Tobago exhibited 
high liquidity, where about a third of their assets were liquid and invested in financial assets. The 
bank may have engaged in credit rationing and it was able to use the high degree of liquid assets to 
                                                     
18  The lack of viability of the long term loans is also related to the intensive use of imported inputs that then require a high export 
performance to achieve minimum efficient size and be viable. 
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hedge against loan default risk. The development bank in Jamaica contained the risk of loan default 
by holding government debt – ranked as having zero default risk – as the major portion of their 
portfolio. Similarly, the development banks in the OECS and Belize exhibited the largest portfolio 
exposure to mortgage loans, and these default rates were lower than loans to industry. In contrast, 
the Bahamas Development Bank had very large portfolio exposures to industry where default rates 
were higher. Moreover, the bank was not very strong with regards to collections as it only recently 
established a loan collections department. 
The experience of the ADB is instructive. In 1993 the ADB experienced rapidly worsening 
asset quality as indicated by a rising ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and a rapidly rising 
ratio of provisions for non-performing loans to total loans well outside of IADB established norms 
it had adopted as performance standards (Table 14; Table 15). While remaining a Tier II 
institution, the ADB adopted and began implementation of a complete basket of reforms developed 
with the assistance of the IADB and covering updates of the following: 
• Management information systems, with particular reference to loan management and the 
general ledger and an updated payroll system. 
• Audit systems. 
• Loan administration covering matters such as review and classification processes; loan 
loss provisions; loan pricing addressing interest rate structure, cost factors such as 
operating expense, financial charges and capital, cost of money, loan loss provisions, 
exceptional factors, profit spread and loan tenor; average portfolio tenor; establishment of 
a risk rating system and risk management modalities; liability control.  
• Management quality, internal organisation and training. 
The fundamental problems were not resolved. A review of ADB performance of 1998 
indicates that, typical of Tier II development banking in the region, the problem of rapidly 
worsening loan quality was recurring despite effective write-offs achieved by the loan loss 
arrangements and provisions instituted. Large losses continued to accumulate (Table 15; Table 16). 
By 2001, the problem had become so bad that the ADB declared itself to be “confronted with a 
financial crisis” and status quo that “does not offer viability prospects”. It warned that “should the 
Bank continue on its present course, its financial performance will continue to deteriorate to the 
point of collapse” (ADB, 2001: i). In that context, it urged that to achieve sustained viability, the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago will be required to provide large scale financial support to the 
Bank to write off accumulated losses (ADB, 2001:iii). The situational assessment in its Strategic 
Plan of 2005-2007 is hardly better (ADB, 2004:39-42). 
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Table 13 
SEVERITY OF NON-PERFORMING LOANS (2002-2004) 
% of total loans Grenada 
Development 
Bank  
(% of total 
loans) 
Development 
Bank of St. 
Kitts and 
Nevis  
























   43.8   
Provision for loan 
losses 
15.9 1.6 3.8  6.3 3.8 
Source: Annual Reports of the respective development banks. 
 
Table 14 


























1991 1,418.14 699.14 179.40 49.30% 246.50% 12.65% 421.70% 
1992 1,558.25 895.84 243.40 57.49% 287.45% 15.62% 520.70% 
1993 1,861.59 1075.07 299.72 57.75% 288.75% 16.10% 536.70% 
Source: ADB Strategic Plans, various years. 
 
Table 15 
ADB PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 1995-1999 
 Asset 
Quality 
































1995 3.58% -5.50% -42.64% 487.05% 13.34% 23.51% 708.28% 
1996 11.79% -7.71% -50.96% 338.89% 19.62% 30.97% 526.69% 
1997 16.56% -2.79% -20.40% 172.52% 16.78% 23.98% 165.58% 
1998 14.84% 3.24% 19.26% 68.83% 13.06% 25.95% 125.76% 
1999 17.54% 1.22% 5.80% 85.24% 15.75% 33.87% 89.99% 
* Before risk adjustment. 
** Total loan portfolio includes interest. 
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Table 16 
ACCUMULATED LOSSES OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK,  
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, 1977-2000 ($M) 
Item Value Notes 
Opening accumulated losses brought forward 1977 -1.827  
Loss for the financial year 1977 -0.481  
Profit for the financial year 1978 0.047  
Loss for the financial year 1979 -3.495  
Loss for the financial year 1980 -0.529  
Loss for the financial year 1981 -4.612  
Loss for the financial year 1982 -8.160  
Profit for the financial year 1983 1.124  
Profit for the financial year 1984 1.199  
Loss for the financial year 1985 1.918  
Loss for the financial year 1986 - Adjustment of $23.5 million, to reverse interest 
accrued in previous years, change in accounting 
treatment to recognize interest only on performing 
loans 
Loss for the financial year 1987 -12.717  
Loss for the financial year 1988 -3.587  
Loss for the financial year 1989 -8.210  
Loss for the financial year 1990 -7.433  
Loss for the financial year 1991 -11.654  
Loss for the financial year 1992 -5.907  
Loss for the financial year 1993 -25.228 Exchange loss 16 million on restatement of CDB 
Loss for the financial year 1994 -90.622 Loan loss expense 73 million 
Loss for the financial year 1995 -71.320  
Loss for the financial year 1996 -80.760  
Loss for the financial year 1997 -5.871  
Profit for the financial year 1998 6.630  
Closing accumulated losses as at 31/12/98 -222.959  
Closing accumulated losses as at 31/12/99 -220.900  
Closing accumulated losses as at 31/12/00 208.100  
Closing accumulated losses as at 31/12/01 209.900  
Closing accumulated losses as at 31/12/02 203.000  
Closing accumulated losses as at 31/12/03 189.600  
Source: ADB Strategic Plans, various years 
 
Efficiency and profitability  
This section provides two broad indicators of the performance of the development banks, efficiency 
and profitability. The next will consider the impact of the system on the regional financial sector, 
using as indicators the impact in the two largest economies, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Efficiency  
The Costs of development banking - level and structure 
Salaries formed about 1/3 to 2/5 of total costs of most of the development banks in CARICOM 
(Table 17). One can perceive that this performance tends to be relatively weak when viewed against 
that fact that the CDB achieved rates within the 27% to 41% range for all administrative expenses, 
including translation adjustments to address significant variations in exchange rate (Table 19). 
When measured as operating cost to assets, the development banks reflected efficiency levels 
varying between 1 and 10 per cent (Table 17). The CDB has been achieving ratios between 2.3% 
and 3.5% in 2001-2005 (Table 19). Direct comparisons of this ratio is limited by the fact that the 
banks were not homogeneous in their mode of operations or standardised in accounting practice, 
inclusive of accounting for bad debts. For example, regarding mode of operations, some banks 
diversified their activities and the composition of sectors in the loan portfolio was radically different 
in some cases. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the sample data and the CDB standard that the 
smaller Banks and the Tier II banks such as the Grenada Development Bank and the Bahamas 
Development Bank tend to be less efficient and that this has significant consequences for the cost of 
credit. Development banks with lower efficiency levels found it more expensive to expand credit 
(Table 17). For example, the least efficient banks in the sample, Bahamas Development Bank and 
Grenada Development Bank, expanded credit by 9.2 per cent and 7.2 per cent per dollar of 
overhead cost, while the most efficient bank in the sample, the Development Bank of Jamaica 
expanded credit by 52.8 per cent per dollar of unit cost. 
An important indicator from the viewpoint of the operating cash-flows is the high share of 
staff costs in net revenues. The usual target is under 12%. The CDB standard achievement for all 
administrative costs is typically in the 15%-17% range (Table 19). Against this standard, the staff 
costs of the national development banks of the region tend to be relatively high even for the more 
efficient Tier I banks. In the case of Jamaica, for example, even after the reforms that led to the 
formation of the DBJ, the percentage of staff costs in revenues has tended to exceed 15% (Table 
18). The share of staff costs are even higher in the ADB of Trinidad and Tobago and in other Tier II 
development banking banks and such high staff costs plagued Jamaica’s NDB until its reform into 
the DBJ. 
Table 17 
UNIT COSTS OF DEVELOPMENT BANKS (2002-2004) 























Cost to Assets 1.38% 1.90% 2.47% 9.73% 9.62% 2.33% 
Salary to total Cost 43.40% 30.92% 6.21% 31.43% 34.33%  NA 
Loans Expansion 
to Overhead cost 
52.8 22.5 22.8 7.2 9.2 25.0 
Source: Annual Reports of Development Banks. 
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Table 18 
STAFF COSTS AND OTHER COSTS IN PROFIT AND LOSS POSITION, DBJ 
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 $'000 $'00 $'000 $'000 
Interest Income, on     
Loans 1,001,857 978,220 999,377 991,083 
Government of Jamaica Infrastructural 
Loan Programmes 
   820,682 
Fixed deposits 76,915 23,177 39,050 51,927 
Other 11,466 64,909 176,365 138,486 
Gross Revenues 1,090,238 1,066,306 1,214,792 2,002,178 
Interest Expense 635,290 666,093 596,363 1,282,023 
Net Interest Income 454,948 400,213 618,429 720,155 
Non-Interest Income 294,990 199,137 119,623 181,852 
Net Revenue 749,938 599,350 738,052 902,007 
Depreciation 26,005 23,395 21,105 19,368 
Provision for losses on loans 116,545 103,876 70,001 49,568 
Staff costs 128,003 67,719 110,604 134,267 
Other operation expenses 105,664 217,604 88,552 106,188 
Total Operating Expenses 376,217 217,604 290,262 309,391 
Operating Profit 373,721 381,746 447,790 592,616 
Profit before exceptional items 373,315 381,746 447,790 592,616 
Exceptional Items -80,109 -26,811 158,068 582,235 
Net Profit 293,206 354,935 605,858 1,174,851 
Staff costs % of Gross Revenue 11.7% 6.4% 9.1% 6.7% 
Staff costs % of Gross Revenue 17.1% 11.3% 15.0% 14.9% 
Operating Expenses as % Net Revenues 50.2% 36.3% 39.3% 34.3% 
Source: Annual Reports, Development Bank of Jamaica. 
Note: Financial Year Ending March. 
Table 19 
CDB COST INDICATORS, YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31 ($’000 FOR VOLUMES) 
Ratios  2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Cost to Assets 2.9% 2.6% 2.3% 2.9% 3.5% 
Admin Expense to Total Expenses 27% 41% 40% 30% 33% 
Admin Expense to Average Earning Assets 0.8% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 1.2% 
Admin Expense to Net Income 15% 20% 17% 16% 16% 
Source: CDB Annual Report, 2005. 
 
General profitability 
As with all institutions operating in a market economy, long run viability of development banks 
requires that over time there is growing relative reliance on profits and net cash flows to finance 
expansion. In that regard, the profitability of development banks is a matter of concern, especially 
when viewed from the viewpoint of asset turnover (asset productivity) since this indicates the 
capacity of the institutions to generate increasing flows to target sectors over time. 
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CDB profitability 
As an AAA-rated entity, the CDB essentially represents a sound gold-standard by which other 
Development banks in the region can be judged with respect to asset productivity. In that regard, 
since 2001 its return on assets has tended to be above 5% (Table 20). 
Profitability of national development banks 
Many of the Caribbean’s Development banks now record small net profits, reflecting the reversal in 
performance since structural adjustment and consolidation. This includes the ADB in Trinidad and 
Tobago (Table 15). Two Tier I development banks, Development Finance Corporation (Belize) and 
Bahamas Development Bank, have been recording losses, with the loss being minor for the latter 
bank (Table 21) and the consequence of a poor business model and government interference in the 
case of the DFC. The more important consideration however, is that the return on assets, the key 
indicator of performance that signals long term capacity to lend, tends to be well below the average 
market performance of the CDB. In all cases, asset productivity is below 2.6%, which was achieved 
by the most efficient DBJ, a Tier I institution and lender to government. The sample of development 
banks provides no reliable indications that in current mode they have the long run capacity for 
viable credit expansion to the target sectors on an increasingly cost effective basis.  
Here, the Tier I banks must be distinguished from the Tier II cases. The evidence suggests 
that Tier I development banks can indeed by economically viable. This is supported by the fact that 
while most banks in the sample exhibited net profits, the Tier I cases are able to offer credit at a 
higher rate and much more efficiently that the Tier II cases. As a general matter, one might 
conclude that Tier II development banking operations have characteristically low profitability or 
high loss rate, with high operating expenses to operating income, and high liabilities relative to total 
equity. With such performance, it is clear that even the subsidised interest rates offered by the Tier 
II institutions tend to be high in real terms to the economy, since these interest rates must be 
adjusted upward to reflect the consequences to society of excessive costs of operations and 
accumulated losses. 
Table 20 
PROFITABILITY INDICATORS FOR CDB, 2001-2005 
Indicator 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 
Annual Return on Average 
Earning Assets 
5.47% 5.12% 5.09% 5.20% 6.99% 
Return on Loans  6.27% 6.01% 6.10% 5.89% 7.43% 
Return on Investments 2.64% 2.01% 2.15% 3.37% 5.22% 
Source: CDB Annual Report, 2005. 
 
Table 21 






























2.0% 2.6% (0.1%) 0.5% 0.7% (4.7%) 2.6% 
Source: Annual Reports, various Development Banks. 
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Selected lessons from privatisation and Tier I development banking 
The DBJ and the DFL (Caribbean) are good examples of the consequences of reforms that promote 
internal efficiency and profitability in the development banking sector. These reforms have tended to 
be either privatisation or focus on pure Tier I banking. In the case of the DBJ, the move was to 
abandon most if its Tier II operations and shift largely to Tier I operations. By contrast with the Tier II 
operations, in the four years since the reforms that led to the formation of the DBJ to focus on Tier I 
operations, the bank has been profitable and the level of profits has grown over time. Provisions for 
bad loans have also fallen both in volume and as a proportion of the profits generated. 
In the case of the Development Finance Limited (DFL) of Trinidad and Tobago, the reformed 
institution emerged in 1970 from the Development Finance Corporation the original intent was to 
create a Tier II  institution that would lend directly to the private industrial sector, operating as a 
sister institution of the ADB. It had much the same fate, being organised in the same way. Initially 
the government of Trinidad and Tobago provided equity of 95% and controlled all major 
operations. One of the key initial objectives was to foster the development of the capital market but 
this never materialized from its Tier II operations. 
In 1987, its failure to achieve its objectives led to wider reforms that brought in major private 
sector injection of equity and a restructuring of the company. As at 2002, government owned only 
28.1% of share and there was significant international participation. The top shareholding 
percentages are as follows:  
• RBTT Financial Holdings Limited 29.7% 
• Government of T&T 28.1% 
• European Investment Bank 8.5% 
• Inter-American Investment Corporation 8.5% 
The main focus was placed on profitability, so new areas of activity and modes of operation 
tackled, as follows: 
• International lending 
• Investment in risk capital operations 
• Foreign currency lending 
• Lending to export-oriented manufacturing, industrial services and tourism 
Today, the DFL has evolved into a vibrant, competitive, leading-edge provider of finance, 
risk capital and strategic management services in the region. It has left the ranks of development 
banking and operates as a normal private merchant bank and finance company licensed under the 
Financial Institutions Act of Trinidad and Tobago as such. It is a member of the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago and is registered with the Trinidad and Tobago Securities and 
Exchange Commission. DFL describes itself as the region’s private industrial development bank 
serving the private sector through its subsidiaries operating throughout the region. These include: 
• Caribbean Development Capital Limited – private equity investments 
• Caribbean Development Network Limited – industrial management consulting 
• Caribbean Microfinance Limited – creating entrepreneurs of the future. 
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It finances 
• Plant and equipment needs 
• Construction and infrastructure works 
• Working capital needs 
• Raw materials  




The DFL is financially sound, as demonstrated for example by its strong capital adequacy 
and the ability to raise funds on capital markets. It has a long-term foreign currency rating of BB 
from FITCH Inc. which allows it to be compared internationally with any other rated bank in terms 
of its ability to meet foreign currency commitments to its investors. However, in practice, the 
institution has low exposure to the high-risk domestic capital sectors that are crucial to the current 
development process.  
The experiences of the DFL and the DBJ appear to point to two important lessons regarding 
the type of lending institution development banks should be. First, in so far as it remains in the 
lending business, development banking should perhaps be Tier I operations and large-scale private 
equity is desirable to increase responsiveness to market signals. Second, the private sector seems 
willing to address the capital sector and its development needs. For example, the DFL is not only 
willing to lend to “the entrepreneurs of the future” but is also willing to consider domestic capital 
needs. However, as signaled by the fact that the economies remained inadequately domestic capital 
intensive, Tier I operations and privatisation have not yet significantly led to a sufficiently flexible 
and rapid flow of resources, at optimal prices, to meet the needs of the priority capital development 
sector (Ministry of Finance, TT, 2004). Thus, the role of an efficient public sector in addressing 
market failure cannot be abandoned. 
Importance of development banking in the financial sector 
This section assesses the current significance of development banks as measured by their share of 
the assets and credit flows of the financial system as a whole. Evidence is drawn from the two 
largest CARCOM economies, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Public capitalisation, asset share and capacity to issue credit 
Public capitalisation has been substantial in a few cases but, by and large due to the limitations of 
the public budgets and public policy perspectives, development banks have tended to be tiny-to-
small-capitalised institutions. This is clearly evident in the overall asset position of the sector in 
relation to the private commercial system.  
In relation to the capacity to issue credit, the share of total banking assets also reveal that 
development banks are of limited significance in the general scheme. Data for Trinidad and Tobago 
show that development banks account for less than 8% of total lending capacity of the main subset 
of lending institutions, including commercial banks, merchant banks and credit unions (Table 22). 
Moreover, despite ongoing reforms to improve their financial performance, the relative share of 
development banks in the asset base and lending capacity of the economy has been declining 
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steadily since 1985 rather than growing to reflect increasing opportunities arising from the changing 
development prospects of the region. In the case of Jamaica, the share of development bank assets 
in the total assets of the set of institutions including commercial banks, credit unions and merchant 
banks has consistently been below 6% since 1980 (Table 23). 
Table 22 
DEVELOPMENT BANK ASSETS AS A SHARE OF SELECTED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,  
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Year Commercial 








Banks TT$ M 
Share of 
Development 
Banks in Subset 
Assets 
1966 300.5 - 13.1 4.1 0.013 
1975 1555.9 79.6 52.7 73.9 0.042 
1980 5215.9 485.3 210.5 297.3 0.048 
1985 10165.1 1235.1 695.3 980.4 0.075 
1990 12178.2 1172.3 1722.4 1075.6 0.067 
1995 20053.6 2090.3 2500 993 0.039 
1999 26474 4014 2800 1009 0.029 
2001 32933.1 4791.5 2837.6 1349 0.032 
2002 38136.8 6251.2 2837.6 1326.9 0.027 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2004). Reform of the Financial Sector of Trinidad and Tobago - A White Paper, p. 6 
 
Table 23 










Banks JA$ M 
Share of 
Development 
Banks in Subset 
1980 2100.4 527.6 168.2 133.4 0.046 
1985 3046.7 1873.9 429.2 203.2 0.037 
1990 17327.5 7873.5 854.2 634.9 0.024 
1995 44700.0 18311.4 4783.3 3741 0.052 
1999 185605.3 51637.7 12098.8 9437.2 0.036 
2001 221116.7 67449.4 17278.5 12057.9 0.038 
2002 257635.2 83116.5 20002.7 21764.5 0.057 
Source: Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica, various years. 
Note: F.I.A Includes Merchant banks, Finance houses and Trust companies 
 
Share of credit flows 
One consequence of the problems of governance and capacity is that, over the years, even as the 
financial sector has significantly increased its capacity to lend to the development sector without 
inherently improved risk measurement, premiums and developmental effects, development banks 
have consistently accounted for a very small or declining share of the total flow of credit in the 
economy. They have not been able to fill the void of development financing. In the case of Jamaica, 
the sector exceeded 7% only during the period 1976-1980 when government was using the sector to 
draw down on the lending opportunities afforded by the international community in order to attempt 
to control the productive sectors of the economy (Table 24). The relative insignificance of 
development banking in Jamaica is perhaps best illustrated by the virtual abandonment of reporting 
on this aspect of development banking in the Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica (ESSJ) after 
1981 when basic reforms and merging to create the NDB were undertaken to restore viability and 
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transparency to the operations of the subsector. In Trinidad and Tobago, the pattern was broadly 
similar, with the credit share declining over time.  
The data on the declining significance of development banking in credit flows cannot be 
adequately evaluated without reasonable information on the distribution of deposits, applicants and 
approvals in the commercial sector. Development banking might be declining in significance but for 
the high-risk market of creative domestic capital-intensive activity and the socially disadvantaged 
traditionally excluded by the commercial sector, the share of development banks in assets and credit 
flows would tend to be significantly higher and even of growing significance. The same is likely to 
be true of other high-risk groups that can only attract credit through large cash flows and high 
turnover, such as groups with relatively high debt-to-asset ratios, low solvency, high cash-flow 
variability and inadequate assets available for collateral even if cash-flow potential is high. Without 
a sound development banking system to generate loans at reasonable cost, many of these actual and 
potential borrowers would most likely remain unable to obtain sufficient credit, even if guaranteed, 
to begin or maintain their operations. Adequate data are not available on the structure of credit 
flows to these sectors, when evaluated in terms of structure of assets and capital, and related risk 
profile.  
Lack of access to this data is a significant limitation of the entire study. However, some 
indications are available for selected sectors known to be historically high-risk or to be among the 
emerging sectors. For the case of Jamaica, the data in Table 25 show that Development banks 
accounted for more than 55% of agricultural and agro-industrial credit since 2002, with the share 
growing up to 2004. The share declined to 45% in 2005 reflecting both a decline of DB credit and 
an increase of commercial bank flows to the sector. It is interesting that the development bank share 
of tourism sector credit also declined steadily from 10% to 3.6% between 2002 and 2005 mainly 
because credit from commercial banks increased substantially. Even more interesting, commercial 
banks offered all significant, if only small, credit to the entertainment sector. Entertainment makes 
highly intensive use of domestic capital and tourism is highly integrated with the entertainment 
sector. The trends for these two sectors reveal not only the tendency for commercial banks to 
increase exposure to the high-risk, high-profit domestic capital-intensive sectors but also for 
development banks to avoid or minimise similar exposure. The trend reflects the regional failure of 
the development banking sector to be adequately guided by sound interpretation of the development 
problem. 
The credit share of agricultural loans of the ADB of Trinidad and Tobago is particularly 
interesting, since it has survived as a single entity throughout the development era and remained 
focused on the agricultural sector throughout. The volume and share of ADB credit in total credit to 
the agricultural sector has been falling steadily since 1995 in a context of overall decline in lending 
to the sector. The ADB led the decline in lending and its share in total loans outstanding fell from 
23.3% in 1995 to 16.9% in 2003 (Table 26).  
In general, the evidence suggests a tendency for development banks to be of minor 
significance in the current financial system and indeed to be losing its significance as the 
commercial sector increases its exposure to the credit risks of the priority development sectors of 
the economy. One reason for this is that development banks have been mainly small government 
owned institutions that have been unable to adjust to the possibilities and dictates of the market. 
Perhaps even more important, by failing to adequately serve the emerging creative sector, the 
development banking sector has not tended to grow based on the changing structure of the 
economy. The main reason may be the historical policy vision that development banks should be 
Tier II institutions catering to the socially disadvantaged or to a few emerging sectors that are not 
well known by the commercial sector. However, if appropriately reformed, development banks can 
play a more powerful role in the development of services that ultimately stimulate the 
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transformation of the commercial sector itself while meeting the needs of the target sectors. That is 
the thrust of the proposals below. 
Table 24 
DEVELOPMENT BANK SHARE OF COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CREDIT,  
SELECTED YEARS, JAMAICA 
Year Commercial Bank Credit 
(J$m) 
Development Bank Credit 
(J$m) 
Share of Development 
Banks (%) 
1969 244.4 3.0 1.2% 
1972 420.1 9.8 2.3% 
1976 673.0 88.9 11.7% 
1978 767.7 106.3 12.2% 
1979 900.9 109.8 10.9% 
2001 52061.4 3880.9 6.9% 
2002 77507.0 4003.7 4.9% 
2003 105081.1 3743.0 3.4% 
2004 120221.3 4208.4 3.4% 
2005 140765.5 3583.5 2.5% 
Source: Various Development Banks; ESSJ; Bank of Jamaica 
 
Table 25 
DEVELOPMENT BANK SHARE OF CREDIT, SELECTED SECTORS, 2002-2005 



















2002 1,809.1 2,246.8 55.4% 205.1 0.0 7,334.1 825.8 10.1% 
2003 1,515.5 2,054.4 57.5% 111.5 0.0 12,342.9 822.0 6.2% 
2004 1,543.0 2,247.9 59.3% 310.0 0.0 16,077.4 1,116.3 6.5% 
2005 2,362.6 1,923.5 44.9% 345.9 0.0 23,764.9 897.5 3.6% 
Source: Annual Reports, BOJ. 
* Includes Financial Institutions Act Licensees (FIA’s); !includes the National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica. 
 
Table 26 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK MARKET SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT,  
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Year Total Loans Outstanding to 
Agricultural Sector (TT$m) 
ADB Loans Outstanding to 
Agricultural Sector (TT$m) 
ADB Share of Sector Credit 
1995 514.0 120.0 23.3% 
1996 580.0 116.0 20.0% 
1997 600.0 131.9 22.0% 
1998 689.3 141.6 20.5% 
1999 645.8 134.1 20.8% 
2000 547.0 120.0 21.9% 
2001 507.0 96.0 18.9% 
2002 516.0 83.0 16.1% 
2003 498.0 84.0 16.9% 
Source: Agricultural Development Bank Strategic Plans, various years. 
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Weak development banking in the midst of high liquidity and idle 
financial capital and unmet needs of the target sectors 
There is substantial evidence from the two largest economies of CARICOM that the declining 
impact of the Development banks is occurring in the context of a persistent and high degree of 
liquidity in the banking and simultaneous high real interest rates, indicated by the high liquid assets 
to deposits ratio of commercial banks. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago since 1994, excess 
liquidity, as measured by the ratio of actual to required liquidity has generally been more than 24% 
above requirements (Table 27). In Jamaica, the liquidity ratio has been lower than in Trinidad and 
Tobago but still in excess of what is required for efficient inflation management (Table 28). The 
data in both Table 27 and Table 28 also hint at the patterns of interest rate movement that is 
relatively independent of the level of liquidity though the time series is not long enough the make a 
definitive measure. The problem has plagued Caribbean policy makers since the 1960s because of 
the built in capacity of the private banks to respond flexibly to demand pressures and trigger 
inflationary pressures especially from consumers, while failing to target the domestic capital sector. 
For example, in Jamaica, local and international monetary policy treated inflation as a matter of 
priority throughout these decades, with significant focus on the restraint on the growth of domestic 
credit (Central Planning Unit, 1969; National Planning Agency, 1973; National Planning Agency, 
1980; PIOJ, 1992: 5.1; 1994:5.1). Indeed, this condition of excess liquidity has come to be viewed 
as a central characteristic and problem of the financial sector in the Caribbean; partly because of the 
problem it poses to financial regulators seeking leverage to control inflationary pressures. It has also 
long been coincident with inadequate credit flows at high costs to priority sectors – the core 
indicator of financial market failure. The development banks were established to address this 
problem. 
Table 27 
LIQUIDITY IN THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FINANCIAL SECTOR 





















Savings Gov’t C- Bank 
Prime 
1994 11,238.30 2,925.10 0.26 2,115.50 0.19 0.38 - - - - 
1995 12,349.90 2,661.90 0.22 2,013.20 0.16 0.32 - - - - 
1996 12,888.10 3,049.70 0.24 2,122.30 0.16 0.44 - - - - 
1997 14,164.20 2,959.20 0.21 2,512.30 0.18 0.18 - - - - 
1998 16,202.40 3,443.40 0.21 2,770.00 0.17 0.24 - - - - 
1999 16,462.20 3,412.20 0.21 2,557.70 0.16 0.33 14.1 11.4 18.7 9.7 
2000 18,478.40 3,832.40 0.21 2,943.00 0.16 0.3 13.2 9.9 18.3 8.9 
2001 21,230.50 4,468.40 0.21 3,465.80 0.16 0.29 12.1 9.1 15.7 7.6 
2002 21,455.40 3,783.20 0.18 3,071.60 0.14 0.23 10.3 9 15.7 6.9 
2003 21,524.70 3,666.00 0.17 2,955.30 0.14 0.24 10.5 7.3 19.9 6.7 
2004 25,868.80 3,439.50 0.13 2,782.50 0.11 0.24 7.8 6.5 13.8 6 
Source: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago Website. 
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Table 28 
LIQUIDITY AND INTEREST RATES IN JAMAICA’S FINANCIAL SECTOR 






Interest Rate Indicators 
     Mean  
3-12 
Months 
Savings Government Commercial 
Bank Prime 
1957 £M 5.7 36.4 0.157 3.0 2.0 2.5-3 7.0 
1958 £M 5.9 38.1 0.155 3.0 2.0 2.5-3 5.5 
1959 £M 8.2 41.8 0.196 2.0 2.5 2.5-3 5.5 
1999 $M 11695.7 123142.1 0.095 14.1 11.4 18.7 9.7 
2000 $M 13874.0 137631.0 0.101 13.2 9.9 18.3 8.9 
2001 $M 17514.2 150950.1 0.116 12.1 9.1 15.7 7.6 
2002 $M 20373.0 169908.2 0.120 10.3 9.0 15.7 6.9 
2003 $M 34394.5 190050.4 0.181 10.5 7.3 19.9 6.7 
2004 $M 38051.5 228425.4 0.167 7.8 6.5 13.8 6.0 
Source: Bank of Jamaica 
 
In addition, investment opportunity for banks and other financial institutions remains 
narrowly focused on foreign stocks or mutual funds, the narrow range of stocks in the local markets 
in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica, and most importantly government bonds. 
The sector features other weaknesses related to the capacity to finance domestic capital 
development and accumulation, with respect to matters such as the patterns of credit allocation; 
interest rate spread, the cost of credit and the reserve requirements established for commercial 
banks; consumer and investor protection; the structure of the capital markets; the underlying 
information architecture; credit rating and the governing legislative and regulatory frameworks as 
well as accounting standards (Table 29). In particular,  
• The financial sector generally concentrates most of its credit on consumer activity and on 
increasing consumption per worker rather than on the development of a capital sector and 
increasing the relative size of the domestic capital sector and therefore raising domestic 
capital per worker and capital per unit of imports at the level of the firm, productive sector 
or economy. 
• Very little of the credit that goes to the productive sectors targets domestic capital 
development and accumulation. 
• The sector is almost completely locally focused, does not develop its own technologies, 
and is correspondingly subject to a number of problems associated with small markets in 
which high minimum efficient size binds. 
− The interest rate on loans in most countries is relatively high and correspondingly so is 
the interest rate spread.  
− Moreover, the spread is growing with the liberalisation of financial markets partly 
because financial institutions have high fixed and operating costs relative to their (low) 
volume of operations, the inadequate development of the methods/instruments needed to 
penetrate foreign markets and high opportunity costs associated with high reserve 
requirements.  
− These reserve requirements are set to give the financial authorities sufficient traction to 
deal with high liquidity in the banking sector in the absence of a wide range of financial 
instruments that can absorb such liquidity. 
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• Inadequate flow of information to clients, a flow which is mainly demand-driven rather 
than routine information sharing and disclosure. There are no significant commercial 
vendors of information. At the same time, there is significant unauthorised sharing of 
confidential information and weak market surveillance.  
• Associated with the inadequate flow of information is the inefficient definition, 
measurement, pricing and spread of risk and hence the slow pace of development of risk-
spreading instruments. Correspondingly, issuers of bonds (including government) and 
other instruments are not required to have credit rating or capital adequacy requirements, 
so efficient credit-rating agencies have not developed to underpin the development of the 
financial markets. 
• Regional financial institutions have a relatively poor reputation as low quality and 
uncreative institutions. 
• The markets are narrow and fragmented, with  
− A limited number of participants in primary market and fewer in secondary market;  
− A narrow range of instruments, mainly national and regional government bonds.  
− Bias toward debt financing over equity; and bias to equity from existing closed network 
of shareholders. 
− Limited private sector involvement, a tiny stock market with high degree of interlocking 
directorships, non-transparency, and low liquidity. 
− A resulting low capacity to mobilise funds and allocate resources efficiently, especially to 
facilitate domestic capital development. 
• With the exception of Jamaica since its financial crises of the late 1990s, the legislative 
and regulation framework of the region is still relatively weak and accounting methods 
employed in the region are yet to be fully standardised around the lines of the IFRS 
though significant strides have been made in this direction by Jamaica and the CDB. 
At the same time, even without reference to privatised development institutions such as the 
DFL, there has been growth of bank credit to the business sector, and in particular to the target 
sectors, including students investing in education. This reflects a changing demand for portfolio 
diversification and a related supply side adjustment on the one hand and an increase in the average 
productivity and general viability of the target sectors on the other, with particular regard to 
businesses run by self-employed without employees. The increase in exposure to the target sectors 
has been supported by an interesting development of credit insurance, referred to as creditor life 
insurance plans, a form of term insurance over the life of the loan, offered by insurance and the 
banks who have been taking advantage of financial sector liberalisation to establish insurance 
subsidiaries within banks. Correspondingly, as documented above, development banks have been 
servicing a declining share of the market, even in highly specialised areas such as agriculture. 
Ultimately, it is this trend that has to be boosted by financial sector and development banking 
reforms, just as some of the problems identified should be addressed by the types of reforms 
proposed for development banks. 
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Table 29 
CHARACTERISTIC WEAKNESSES OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN THE CARIBBEAN 
Characteristic Observed Weakness Desired Condition Main Challenges Facing Financial 
Sector 
Credit Allocation ° Consumer sector is the 
largest recipient of credit. 
° Among productive sectors, 
domestic capital receives 
minimal credit. 
° Majority of credit should be 
extended to productive sectors 
of strategic importance. 
° Credit flows to capital 
producing sectors should grow 
faster than to all others. 
° Develop market mechanisms, in 
particular derivative products, to 




° High interest rate spread. 
° Spread growing with the 
liberalisation of financial 
markets. 
° High fixed costs tied to 
inadequate development of 
the methods/instruments 
needed to penetrate foreign 
markets. 
° High opportunity costs of 
holding high reserves.  
° Low interest rate spread. 
° Spread falling with the 
development of the financial 
sector. 
° Develop market mechanisms, in 
particular derivative products, to cut the 
cost of credit to the capital producing 
sectors. 
° There is some evidence that high 
official reserve requirements may not 
be the main factor here. The internal 
market structure of the commercial 
market is more important in this regard, 
along with high economic reserves and 
related high admin costs, etc. It is 
important for the financial sector to 




° Official reserve requirements 
for banks are set to address 
the negative (inflationary) 
effects of excess liquidity in 
the banking sector. However, 
they do not appear to be 
binding. Banks hold 
significantly higher economic 
reserves. 
° Lower reserves consistent 
with cost reduction. 
° The key here may not simply be to 
lower official reserve requirements in 
relation to capital market development 
requirements. This appears to require 
a creative banking sector developing of 
suitable investment instruments in 
relation to its build up of information 




° Fraud; misuse of funds;  
° Inadequate flow of 
information to clients; mainly 
demand driven. 
° Unauthorised sharing of 
confidential information. 
° Reputation as low quality and 
uncreative institutions. 
° Improved the flow of 
information flows.  
° Flexible instruments of higher 
quality. 
° Timely settlement of disputes. 
° Improvement of regulation; accounting 
standards.  
° Routine flow of information. 
° Creative product design to penetrate 




° Narrow and fragmented 
market, with limited number 
of participants in primary 
market and fewer in 
secondary market. 
° Narrow range of instruments, 
mainly national and regional 
government bonds. High 
premium on government 
bonds. 
° Bias toward debt financing 
over equity; and bias to equity 
from existing closed network 
of shareholders. 
° Limited private sector 
involvement, tiny stock 
market with high degree of 
interlocking directorships, 
non-transparency, and low 
liquidity. 
° Low capacity to mobilise 
funds and allocate resources 
efficiently, especially to 
facilitate domestic capital 
development. 
° Weak information systems 
and inadequate market 
surveillance. 
° Broader market and stronger 
secondary market. 
° High quality and transparent 
corporate governance. 
° Standardised disclosure 
requirements. 
° Upgrade information systems to 
international standards. 
° Improve transparency in market 
process to meet international 
standards. 
° Lower premium on government bonds 
in line with global standards. 
° Improved regulation; accounting 
standards to meet changing 
international standards. 
° Improved risk measurement and 
pricing. 
° Integration into the international 
financial markets and increased 
capacity for local agencies to compete 
with international agencies in both the 
local and global markets. 
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Table 29 (conclusion) 




° Absence of routine and 
continuous disclosure and 
information sharing. 
° Absence of commercial 
vendors of in formation. 
° Inefficient measurement and 
pricing of risk and hence of 
securities. 
° Routine information sharing 
° Appropriate yield curves (term 
structure of interest rates).19 
° Introduction of commercial vendors 
° Routine construction of full yield curve 
from market data. 
° Sustained credit rating of all 
participants 
Credit Rating ° Issuers of bonds and other 
instruments not required to 
have credit rating or capital 
adequacy requirements. 
° Absence of efficient credit-
rating agencies 
° Issuers of instrument in the 
key markets have adequate 
capital. 
° Trusted credit rating agencies 
linked to the international 
rating agencies.  
° Establishment of credit rating agencies 
tied to the international agencies but 
taking account of local circumstances. 
° Supporting legislative framework to 






° Weak regionally, especially 
when viewed regionally, 
primarily with respect to 
accounting standards. 
° Jamaica has adopted IFRS; 
Legislative frameworks has 
been strengthened in Jamaica 
following Finsac experience; A 
regional harmonisation of 
practices is needed.  
° Comprehensive legislation covering all 
financial sector. 
° Adoption of IFRS regionally. 
° Introduction of adequate supervisory 
and regulatory system, with regional 
harmonisation. 
Source: Annual Reports, Interviews with Institutions and Discussions with Stakeholder Focus Group. 
Stakeholder views  
To make up for the absence of strong secondary data or a primary survey of customers and 
institutions, a meeting of stakeholder financial institutions was held in Jamaica to ensure adequate 
representation of the opinions and experiences of the development banking sector in shaping the 
way forward. It is important to observe here that Jamaica is the largest CARICOM economy in 
population terms and has about 40% of its labour force in subsistence activity. The meetings and 
interviews provided the data reported in Table 30 and Table 31. 
Customer needs 
Regarding customer needs (Table 30), stakeholder responses placed emphasis on the need in the 
target sector for cheaper credit, greater sharing of risks, better advertising of options by 
development banks and better technical support with respect to the development of business 
models, including special attention to the needs of small and medium enterprises. There was also 
considerable emphasis on the need for the development banks to better understand the profiles of all 
potential clients in the target sector and to be less prohibitive in terms of application procedures and 
more flexible and transparent in loan processing.  
Two main consensus views emerged from the stakeholder session. One is the need to give 
much greater attention to developing collateralisation methods and in that regard to further 
development and expansion existing provisions for external collateral support to Tier II institutions, 
such as are provided by the USAID through the Jamaica National Commercial Bank. The other is 
the need to facilitate more cash-flow based lending by relaxing existing regulations on that form of 
lending while increasing monitoring and supervision to ensure that new rules are followed and 
programmes remain viable. Commercial banks were of the view that such relaxation would 
dramatically increase the flow of credit to all sectors, including the target sector. However, there 
was some concern that the need to protect the funds of depositors must remain a matter of priority 
and in that regard collateralisation and securitisation mechanisms had to be correspondingly 
                                                     
19  The term structure of interest rates (or yield curve) is a function relating the interest rate (cost of borrowing) or yield of fixed income 
assets to the (term of) maturity of the assets in a given currency at a given time. This is particularly important in the analysis of fixed 
income securities, such as bonds, to understand how conditions in the financial markets might give rise to trading opportunities. It is 
also used by economists in so-called developed countries to assess the prospects for a recession (which might occur if short term 
yields are higher than long term yields and motivate reduction in capital formation). The term structure of interest rates is the natural 
starting point for pricing fixed-income securities and other financial assets. However, it is not well-developed in CARICOM 
economies because of the narrow base of instruments. 
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strengthened even if not simply by seeking such collateral from the direct borrower. The need for 
external mechanisms in this context could be met through a combination of government-backed 
assets and foreign development assistance such as is being provided by the USAID. There was 
support for the view that a special institutional arrangement that is CARICOM in scope should be 
developed as a vehicle for delivering such support. Commercial banks also expressed the view that 
if the target group is to be given the best chances of success in the modern marketplace, expansion 
of credit flows at lower cost and securitisation must be accompanied by much stronger technical 
support and development of suitable business models for the target sector. 
Stakeholder Evaluation of Weaknesses in the Development 
Banking System 
With regard to the weaknesses of the development banking sector to meet the identified needs, the 
stakeholders expressed views summarised in Table 31. The feedback is that notwithstanding high 
levels of liquidity in the system, Development banks, including Tier I Banks, have inadequate 
ability to find sufficient cheap funds to make available to the target sectors. This also covers the 
case of the supply flowing from the CDB to the Tier I banks and from the Tier I banks to the Tier II 
banks. One reason for that is low financial performance of the Development banks. Another is the 
incapacity of the governments, as main shareholders, to make the requisite funds available. A 
leading commercial bank in the consultations expressed the view that government’s own high 
demand for funds to address its deficits was having both a crowding out effect and the effect of 
making financing of development banks expensive. The stakeholders concurred with the evidence 
that, as currently organised, development banks have significant efficiency problems, featuring 
weak information and research systems, weak loan collection systems (especially at Tier II) 
bureaucratic procedures and the lack of personalised banking tied to the cash-flows of customers.  
Further, there was general agreement that the institutions are excessively public-sector 
oriented in terms of their business models, with a tendency to operate an inadequately goal-driven 
process and with poor performance monitoring and evaluation. Boards are not known to dismiss 
management because of failure to meet clear board-specified goals tied to indicators such as the 
percentage of viable loans to specific target sectors, the credit-cost ratio defined to include loss due 
to bad loans and provisions for losses and the number of successful businesses assisted in the target 
sector and that have consequently moved into the commercial sector. There was a strong opinion, 
expressed in writing and generally supported by the verbal dialogue, that Development banks make 
inadequate use of credit unions and other similar institutions to provide Tier II services, despite the 
proven capacity of such institutions to address the needs of the target groups. Finally, in relation to 
the capacity to devise adequate instruments, DBs were viewed as too uncreative and too reliant on 
standard collateralising devices or too willing to let the alternative resort to running up bad loans. In 
one exchange, a leading commercial bank and a leading DB challenged each other to have a serious 
joint look at updated collateralising and securitisation possibilities, with particular reference to the 
use of external assistance for this purpose. 
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Table 30 
BANK EVALUATION CUSTOMER NEEDS AND DEMANDS 
Issues Addressed Customer Views 
Customers currently rely on a word of mouth mechanism and many public 
advertisements to judge credit possibilities. For example, the DBJ agrees that this 
is fair comment in that the DBs are generally not sufficiently aggressive with 
advertisement when compared to the other commercial entities.  
Information about credit 
possibilities 
Development Banks do not advertise services as well as the commercial banks do. 
Low interest rates 
Repayment flexibility Main attraction to Development Banks 
Collateral flexibility 
Long loan application forms and tedious application process 
Long and bureaucratic loan processing Complaints 
Excessively stringent and unclear criteria for granting loans 
Less reliance on collateral and security and provide relaxed collateral 
requirements. Institutions such as the DBJ support the creation of a regional facility 
for this purpose. 
Opportunity for cash-flow based borrowing. This is a high risk mechanism; requires 
strong individual and business credit rating and supporting collateralisation. There 
is need to clarify the risk structure that attends such a system. 
Longer terms on available loans 
Lower interest rates and other low cost services; need to address technical 
facilitation – applications, proposals, etc. 
Opportunity to restructure and refinance debt. 
Opportunity to finance capital expansion 
Larger loans – increase lending limits without increasing collateral requirements 
Assistance with loan guarantees / government guarantees 
Better facilities for small businesses  
Expansion of the types of businesses that can borrow. 
Share the risk involved in the investment or offer lower rates to allow better net 
margin (earnings after interest). 
Customer demands/needs from 
Development Banks 
Better technical support. 
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Table 31 
STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK ON WEAKNESSES OF DEVELOPMENT BANKING SYSTEM 
Area Weakness Comments 
Under the existing business models, the 
Development Banks are unable to source 
adequate levels of low cost funds to support their 
customers’ demand for loans, especially after 
adjusting for the high default rates on the loan 
portfolios. 
This was traced partly to poor financial 
performance and was viewed as applicable 
notwithstanding the access to CDB Funds. The 
current exception may be Trinidad and Tobago 
but the experience of the ADB does not suggest 
an exception applies. 
Financial Resources 
The principal shareholders of the Development 
Banks (Governments) are unable to provide 
adequate funds to facilitate the demand of the 
bank’s current customers or to expand coverage 
to the highly creative capital-intensive sectors. 
This is especially true if one takes into account 
the high costs linked to default. 
The main reason cited is the growing budget 
debts and deficits and the high cost of debt 
servicing that limit the budgetary room of 
government. However, there is also the policy 
stance tied to structural adjustment and the 
WTO agreements. This aspect of the analysis 
embraces Trinidad and Tobago’s ADB. 
Inappropriate information systems and 
information management processes, including 
inadequate data analysis and definition of 
standards, which result in inefficient decision-
making processes. 
Failure to use customer-focused research to 
know the client base from a risk measurement 
viewpoint. The same therefore applies to 
research to design suitable product lines for 
current and new customers. 
These problems are aspects of a wider problem 
of weak information collection and information-
sharing systems in CARICOM. 
Inadequate attention to innovation. This was viewed as tied to inadequate 
investment in suitable human capital in the 
Development Banks. 
Bank procedures are excessively bureaucratic 
and lacking in the urgency evident and 
entrepreneurship evident in the commercial 
banks. Not all Development Banks agreed, 
especially the DBJ; the issue is not lack of 
latitude, it is more a resource constraint and lack 
of knowledge of the industry; even for matters 
such as risk assessment. 
Weak loan collection systems; ADB records and 
DBJ and others admit that the experience with 
Tier II lending has not been good on collections; 
there is a big cultural impediment because 
people view anything from government as 
“should be free”.  
Efficiency issues 
Loan processing is not fast, efficient and flexibly 
personalised in relation to the needs of a 
creative business sector for cash-flow lending. 
The DBs hold that cash-flow lending is limited by 
the habits and methods of default and by the 
need of a strong collection mechanism and 
credit rating. The DBs also hold that technical 
supports would be needed for the primary 
customers if this must work.  
These were viewed as especially relevant to the 
creative sector, which has a high need for 
lending based on actual and pro-forma cash-flow 
or asset turnover. 
Development Banks do not sufficiently focus on 
developing new product lines and instruments to 
attract new types of customers. Inadequate 
differentiation to reflect variations and changes 
in customer base. The DBs agree that there is 
no law to prevent product variation by type of 
customer but that there is limited resources to go 
around and, except for agriculture, it is difficult to 
identify specific industries that require special 
products.  
Development banks do not sufficiently market 
and advertise their services. 
Organisation Structure 
Lack of focus on recruitment of new research 
capacity and high level-skills with new thinking 
about the problem. Excessive public-sector 
mind-set.  
These practices were viewed as inappropriate 
for servicing the highly creative and increasingly 
successful copyright sector and similar sectors 
that is also very high risk and must be guided by 
sound risk analysis. 
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Table 31 (conclusion) 
Area Weakness Comments 
Development banks function as an arm of the 
public service, with respect to appointments, 
control functions, bureaucracy and lack of 
autonomy.  
 
Inadequate attention to routine knowledge 





organizational culture  
Insufficient focus on development of human 
capital development. 
 
Absence of interest in matching the competition 
with suitable products and services. 
 
Absence of creative management practices.  
Banks are not guided by and held to specific 
targets and measurable goals tied to domestic 
capital development. Goals, where they exist, 
are sector linked and frequently tied to the 
emergence of export-oriented activity. 
Examples of what is needed were cited in the 
consultations: (i) percentage of viable loans to 
specific target sectors; (ii) credit-cost ratio 
defined to include loss due to bad loans and 
provisions for losses; (iii) number of successful 
businesses assisted in the target sector. There 
was general agreement that targeting should be 
closely related to the need for rapid development 
of the domestic capital market, financial and real. 
General tendency to non-participatory public-




Poor performance is treated as in the public 
sector and management and boards are not 
normally penalised for failure to meet targets. 
 
Partnership with the 
non-traditional financial 
sector, such as the 
credit unions 
Tier I Development Banks make inadequate use 
of credit unions and other similar institutions to 
provide Tier II services, despite the proven 
capacity of such institutions.  
 
 
Summary reflections - Can development banks as currently 
profiled adequately serve the needs of the domestic capital-
intensive sector? 
Collectively, development banks in the Caribbean evolved to direct credit to agriculture and 
industry and to develop domestic human capital and finance low-cost housing. The governments 
established these institutions in the pre 1980 era, using them to fit into national development plans 
along with incentive schemes to stimulate sectors in the economy. In essence, the central concept of 
domestic capital in those development plans was that of human capital in the form of education, 
health and housing. Even with such narrow focus, the development banks could not meet existing 
needs while remaining financially viable as indicated by a sufficiently high asset turnover rate (say, 
a sufficiently high return on assets). Over the years, the related drain on the national purse tied to 
high loan default led to repeated restructuring of these entities. Those reforms that led to the 
creation of merged and stronger Tier I institutions have worked moderately in the sense that these 
are the most efficient institutions able to offer credit to their clients at significantly lower cost than 
the Tier II institutions. Even when reformed, the Tier II lending institutions have not been very 
profitable, with very low asset turnover rates relative to the Tier II institutions and to the CDB and 
with high costs of credit tied to relatively high relative costs and liabilities to assets and equity.  
The central questions of concern to this section of the study is whether, in an environment of 
declining relative significance and more risk-oriented commercial banking, Development banks as 
currently profiled can adequately target credit facilities to the profitable but highly risky creative 
domestic capital-intensive sector that often must rely on copyright as the basis for defining incomes 
and on cash flows from high and changing asset turnover to demonstrate viability? The general 
answer appears to be “not adequately for development purposes,” if the latter is defined in terms of 
the growing needs of the domestic capital-intensive sector. The specific answer is that as a triple-A-
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rated Tier I Multilateral Development Bank, the CDB is strong enough to lead the process and the 
local Tier I Development banks, with some additional reforms, can be strong partners. Dialogue 
with stakeholders suggest that these reforms can very beneficially focus on strengthened loan 
collections and updating of the type of sectors loaned to reflect the trends in the modern Caribbean 
economy. Some development banks who provide information as stakeholders only recently 
established collections department. Moreover, the internal structure of the Tier I development bank 
needs to be further developed, particularly with respect to building the information and intelligence 
capability of the banks to meet the social objectives assigned to them. 
However, generally, the Tier II institutions are relatively inadequate partners for the CDB and 
the Tier I banks, partly because they are inadequately market oriented and are expensive to operate 
as government owned entities. What is needed are Tier II institutions designed to attract the high 
excess liquidity currently flowing to the commercial sector and steer that towards the emerging 
viable capital-intensive sector. The investment to re-orient the Tier II banks and make the adequate 
partners in this process may be prohibitive. A new type of Tier II lending institution is needed that 
can serve as an adequate partner for the reformed Tier I local facilities and the CDB and it is likely 
that these partners may have to come from the existing Tier II institutions of the private sector that 
are interested in taking on the risks of the capital-intensive sector. In this regard, there is good 
reason for some attention to be directed to the institutional design of the DFL and to institutions 
such as the credit unions and similar indigenous financing institutions that evolved in the private 
sector with similar goals and objectives and similar target groups as development banks should have 
and that have also found effective ways to discipline borrowers with respect to repayment practices. 
Beyond such refocus and strengthening, there is no evidence available of any other approach or 
large-scale mechanism operating in the Caribbean that would be more effective in assisting high-
risk borrowers in obtaining credit to sustain their domestic capital-intensive investments until 
maturity. We therefore direct most of the remainder of the study to defining how the desired refocus 
might be achieved and to considering related reforms that would address the insurance of loans and 
strengthening of the securitisation process as new partnering Tier II institutions are encouraged. 
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3. Reforming development banks – 
the key issues 
Our main concern in this section is the types of reforms needed to ensure 
a pool of local Tier II development financing institutions that can achieve 
the basic goals of the development banking sector while minimising the 
problems. Consistent with the analyses of the previous two sections 
therefore, we take as key goals: 
• Viable provision of the maximum possible credit flows to the 
priority sectors defined in terms of their orientation to employ high 
levels of domestic capital in economic activity. 
• Supply of credit at reasonable cost without the large-scale losses 
that characterise the traditional Tier II development banking 
system. 
• Ensuring timely responses to loan request and loan-servicing 
requests. 
• Improvement of the related technical assistance to the target sectors 
to ensure development of their economic viability and competitive. 
Baseline reforms of development banking sector 
There are several baseline reforms suggested by the experience of the 
development banks, Tier I and Tier II, reviewed above. These are as 
follows: 
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• In so far as they remain in the lending business, development banks should be Tier I 
operations, regional or local I scope, focused primarily on financing the development and 
employment of domestic real capital in all sectors of the economy but with priority to the 
capital producing sectors such as education, health, housing and real domestic assets. 
• Large-scale private equity is desirable to increase responsiveness to market signals and 
ensure increasing viability over time, especially as that relates to attracting credit to 
support increasing investment in domestic capital.  
• Significant, but not dominant, public investment is desirable to represent the public 
interest in addressing market failure in a private sector setting – the board-rooms of 
privatised development banks. This relative dominance of the private sector would 
simultaneously ensure the following: 
− Improved and more flexible modalities of capitalisation that gives adequate room for 
private sector participation and ultimately the phasing out of public equity in the long 
term. 
− Greater flexibility, institutional autonomy, market sensitivity in loan decision-making 
that would address the needs of the wider market while still addressing the needs of the 
development community. 
− Improved, more market-driven recruitment of management skills. 
− Sensitivity to regulatory issues and a means of communicating government policy 
because of the government participation. 
− Rebalancing of the short term (especially working capital) and long term focus 
(installation of real capital assets) of the loan portfolio of the banks to reflect a greater 
measure of the efficiencies demanded by the market. 
− Freedom from undue and inappropriate political interference. 
• A crucial lesson of the DFL experience is that international equity participation in the 
reformed development banks is highly desirable and should be encouraged by specific 
policy and regulatory initiatives. This should include equity from the large so-called 
developing countries. 
• To address the goal of boosting the prospects for competitive success, a special 
CARICOM Regional Technical Support Vehicle (CRTSV) to provide active and 
partially subsidised technical support for the target sectors and to develop suitable 
business models in collaboration with them. The vehicle should be required to operate 
profitably and should be linked actively to strengthened regional devices such as the 
CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ) and to local 
counterparts such as the Standards Bureaus and other Research Institutions. One 
possibility is to reform the Caribbean Industrial Research Institute (CARIRI) for this 
purpose. 
• In the context of some steps to privatisation, Development banks should be required to 
operate according to specific standards and monitored and evaluated accordingly: These 
should include 
− Adequate attention to development of product lines and instruments to attract the new 
types of customers emerging from the development process, with a view to creating 
pressure on the private sector and the affiliated private Tier II institutions to do the same. 
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− Development banks should be guided and evaluated by specific targets and measurable 
goals, including 
° Steady improvement in the viability of supply of credit flows to the priority sectors 
defined in terms of their orientation to employ high levels of domestic capital in 
economic activity. 
° Target rate of return on assets or asset turnover. 
° Steady improvement in the supply cost of credit over some target period. 
° Steady improvement in the timeliness of responses to loan request and loan-
servicing requests from the key target sectors. 
° The success achieved by the beneficiaries of the services of development banks in 
the context of the support for development of viable business models. 
However, it is not expected that these baseline changes will be sufficient to address the 
problems inhibiting suitable targeting of credit to the priority sectors. That is because these reforms 
do not adequately address the management of the risks associated with increased lender exposure to 
the target sectors while ongoing liberalisation makes the financial markets more competitive. That 
requires significant change in the functions assigned to some of the reformed banks. We turn now to 
these functional reforms and the introduction of new risk-management devices to address this issue. 
Agreements from stakeholder focus group 
This report adopts three propositions from the stakeholder consultations: 
• Tier I Development banks, including the CDB, should increase partnership with the credit 
unions, home mortgage banks and other similar institutions to provide Tier II services to 
the target sector. Over time, such private affiliated institutions should replace all Tier II 
institutions that are unable to demonstrate ability to meet clearly designated performance 
standards. 
• A CARICOM Regional Collateralisation, Securitisation and Collection Vehicle 
(CARICOL) should be established to provide a single regional channel for  
− Effective debt collection when default occurs, with adequate recovery opportunity 
provided in conjunction with the CRTSV. 
− Two types of securitisation and collateralisation supports to customers through Tier II 
institutions, on the other: 
° Pooled International collateral and securitisation support for customers, similar to 
the support now provided by the USAID through Tier II institutions. 
° Pooled government collateral and securitisation support for customers, with the 
support. 
• Increase the use of cash-flow lending by the commercial banking sector, with particular 
reference to the target sector. This should be introduced on a harmonised and phased basis 
by establishment of a regional financial sector task force to consider the merits and 
modalities of such a step, including all regulations and accounting standards that would 
attend the move. The mechanism should be linked to the CARICOL vehicle mentioned 
above. 
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Posting of collateral is normally expensive and the ability to use public resources, especially 
public fixed assets, along with international development assistance will be a distinct advantage if 
properly administered and monitored. 
Regarding the securitisation mechanism, the CDB collaboration agreement is a good example 
of what should be done. Affiliated Tier II institutions, including those from the private sector, 
should benefit from the system on the basis of clearly indicated and regionally coordinated 
agreement on the extent of lowering of interest costs to the target sector. 
Phased Introduction of credit default swaps – another view 
To provide a basket of supplementary protection for credit issues under the above schemes, a 
CARICOM initiative should be established to allow for introduction of a regional mechanism for 
insuring credit to the target sector. The process should start with a Phase I featuring introduction of 
credit insurance in the form of credit default swaps – to take advantage of simplicity and ease of 
administration. After a sufficient period of learning by doing, –more sophisticated devices can also 
be introduced. The synthetic devices will greatly facilitate securitisation, collateralisation and debt 
collection at relatively low costs. The suggestion that domestic credit default swaps should be 
introduced is not new. Indeed, one of the more successful government-owned Tier II development 
banks in Jamaica and CARICOM, the National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica has long been 
providing export credit insurance as one of its primary services to the export-substitution sector, and 
in the light of the downturn in such export activity has been actively considering the introduction of 
local credit insurance as a substitute service. The BOJ (2005) reports as follows:  
The National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica (Ex-Im Bank) remained the only institution in 
Jamaica offering export credit insurance to protect non-traditional exports against losses due 
to non-payment by foreign buyers. While this facility is recognized as an indispensable tool, 
particularly in the area of export expansion, usage continues to be low, reflecting a general 
decline in non-traditional exports. Notwithstanding the low usage during 2005, the Ex-Im 
Bank insured exports valued at approximately J$1.0 billion. The institution continued to 
explore the feasibility of the introduction of domestic credit insurance to complement export 
credit insurance. This was based on feedback from existing policyholders and exporters 
utilising Ex-Im Bank’s loan programmes. There were indications that there were benefits to 
be accrued from the introduction of such a product. The new product, if found to be feasible, 
is projected for implementation in 2006. 
In the stakeholder meeting held in Jamaica in relation to this study, the issue of introduction 
of a credit swap (essentially insurance) was similarly favourably received. The main concern was 
feasibility and the proposals below suggest a design to that end. Further studies are needed. 
Swap design 
The proposed credit default swap design is standard and aimed at Tier II lenders: 
• The particular Tier II lender provides credit to one or more customers in the target sector.  
• The Tier II then enters into a contract with CARICOL to make periodic payments for the 
protection in return for a lump sum in the event of default, appropriately defined. This 
would complement the other collateralisation protection offered by CARICOL and can be 
designed to be attractive but optional if there is also a subsidised price to the other 
collateral supports. 
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• CARICOL would also face specific additional risks from the sale of protection, which it 
can protect against with its own capital assets and asset turnover from is investment 
programmes.  
• Either single-name or multi-name swaps can be designed but the multi-name swaps are 
likely to be most relevant to the target beneficiaries. The single-name swaps would be an 
especially attractive way to deal with those customers who evolve rapidly into large 
private capitalists and drop out of the scheme. However, perhaps the more important 
device will be the multi-name credit default swap that groups customers into a basket such 
that the definition of default would vary in terms of defaults by individual customer or the 
portfolio as a whole. In the case of the individual, the default conditions would be defined 
along the following lines: 
− First-to-default - The first of any beneficiary in the basket that defaults would trigger the 
lump sum and termination of the coverage. 
− Second-to-default - The second of any beneficiary in the basket that defaults would 
trigger the lump sum and termination of the coverage. 
− Nth–to-default. 
If the multi-name credit default swap is set up as a portfolio default swap, then the transfer of 
risk is specified in terms of the size of the default loss in the overall portfolio rather than the default 
of individual reference entities. The following options could be defined: 
• First-loss-piece of X% - Here protection sellers are only exposed to the number of 
individual defaults that lead to an X% loss in the overall portfolio. 
• Second-loss-piece of 2X% - Here protection sellers are only exposed to the number of 
individual defaults that lead to a 2X% loss in the overall portfolio. 
• Third-loss-piece of 3X% - Here protection sellers are only exposed to the number of 
individual defaults that lead to a 3X% loss in the overall portfolio. 
The credit default swap market would allow Tier II affiliated institutions to transfer some of 
their credit risk to CARICOL while the DB gets its desired level of exposure to the default risks of 
the customers, thereby promoting their access to credit at reasonable cost that is subsidised through 
the national and international development assistance underlying the institution. In the process, the 
swap would have to be priced in relation to the amount of compensation needed for the potential 
default that is covered. Thus, as with all markets, it forces the risks to be expressed in a price and as 
the market evolves pricing and sale (distribution of risk) are done with increasing efficiency. 
Rationale for expected attractiveness 
The experience with high rates of bad debt and growing credit risk exposure of the Tier II 
institutions “would normally be expected to lead to more sophisticated risk-management 
techniques” and the relative deterioration of the credit portfolio from embracing the priority sectors 
suggest growing need for derivative products to address this risk/exposure (Bomfim, 2005:1; 
Choudhry, 2004:x; 1-10). Currently, the market forces in the Caribbean work in such a way that 
commercial banks are compensated with high interest rates, high user fees and other rewards for 
taking on more credit risk. One form of this compensation is tied to the amount the bank recovers as 
a result of foreclosure. In the Caribbean, banks have the ability to “insure” credit by pursuing 
payment of outstanding principal and interest, with applicable interest, in perpetuity after 
foreclosure. However, this comes without any avenues for recovery of the affected customers and is 
a very expensive way to address the problem with minimal pay-off. An option is transfer some of 
this cost into a derivative scheme, which if developed with international collaboration, a reasonable 
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general subsidy and the securitisation and collection devices referred to above, could actually lower 
the total cost of managing the risky debt without the destruction of recovery opportunity. If Tier II 
lenders are credit-risk averse and demand the type of collateral and securitisation mechanisms 
recommended under the CRTSV and the CARICOL vehicles, it is also rational for them to demand 
insurance to cover earnings loss if such insurance is delivered in a cost-effective way and can avoid 
destroying prospects for the recovery of defaulting business on a sustainable basis.  
Introduction of such a device can be achieved through sale of protection by CARICOL if, as 
in the case of the CDB, CARICOL is established with the level of international and national 
collaboration and the resources needed to make it a large regional AAA-rated institution in a 
reasonably short period of time. The effect of CARICOL insurance and the CRTSV would be to 
transfer at least the credit risks of the target sectors from the Tier II institutions at a price.  
Reservations/Cautions 
The first reservation in determining if and how CARICOL should be established is that the device 
should not excessively limit the evolution of private risk pricing in the market. This reservation was 
raised by the regulatory interests in the stakeholder group. The design protects against this 
eventuality because not all market segments should be covered by the services proposed. Focus is 
on the high-risk development sector and those left behind for sociological reasons or lack of 
adequate assets to cover investment risks.  
The second and more important matter to be considered is whether the cost of insurance will 
be prohibitive and lead to more expensive rather than cheaper credit. This was raised directly by the 
commercial banking interests in the stakeholder group. The response to the objection is that 
CARICOL insurance would simultaneously strengthen the other forms of direct collateral support it 
provides with regional and international collaboration as described above and would also be 
reinforced by its collection activities. Since the price can be subsidised and the risk coverage will be 
complemented by the other direct collateralisation and collection services offered by CARICOL, the 
overall effect should be to lower the cost of credit while encouraging the evolution of a market for 
another type of financial instrument. Sold at subsidised rates, the swaps together with the other 
collateral and securitisation devices of CARICOL should lower the cost of the transactions needed 
to obtain the level of credit default exposure desired by CARICOL. A single sale of protection for a 
basket of loans could yield the same desired exposure (and earnings net of subsidies) as might two 
distinct transactions in the cash market, one of which yields earnings from a corporate note and one 
which yields earnings from a government short-term bond. After taking into account the 
comparative degree of liquidity in the cash and derivatives markets (which would affect transactions 
costs), there is a high probability that the single transactions would result in lower costs to the 
development banks, which are then passed on as cheaper insurance, which are then passed on as 
lower interest rates on loans, and so on. 
How should CARICOL be owned? Lessons from the best practice 
cases of the USA and UK  
In designing CARICOL, some lessons can be learned about the forces, instruments, participants, 
practices and conventions needed by examining international practice. In the USA and UK, in 
response to the rising pressures to manage credit risk, a substantial market for credit derivatives has 
evolved in the last two decades of the 20th Century, with spectacular growth in recent years 
(Choudhry, 2004:6). Regular studies have been done of the evolving characteristics of the 
derivatives market. Especially important are the British Bankers Association survey of the credit 
derivatives market (BBA, 2003/04) and the overview by Bomfim (2005). The BBA (2003/04) 
reports that a major feature of the credit derivatives market is that the main market participants 
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have been banks, securities houses and insurance companies. However, in the founding years of the 
credit derivatives market, most derivatives were written against sovereign/public assets. In 1996, 
54% of the total underwriting assets were sovereign. However, by 2003, only 11% of derivatives 
were written against sovereign assets. By contrast, 64% were written against corporate assets. 
Further, the experience of best practice cases like the USA and the UK is that the major sellers of 
protection in the credit derivatives market have tended to be large and highly rated financial 
conglomerates, the closest to which may be the CDB.  
A device such as CARICOL could provide for all these features by its design. The conclusion 
drawn is that, in addition to the regional governments and the international development partners, 
provision should be made for CARICOL to provide a capital investment opportunity for banks and 
insurance companies as well as securities houses to develop the desired institution. Moreover, 
notwithstanding the underlying programme of complementary securitisation with real assets, the goal 
should be to create a triple-A rated institution with falling public participation over time. 
How should CARICOL services be delivered? 
In each country, CARICOL services can be delivered through the Tier I development banks, 
reformed to include a strong credit collateralisation, insurance and collections unit. 
Other Considerations 
Urgent Strengthening of CariCRIS 
Notwithstanding subsidised services, the price of all the CARICOL protection services will 
ultimately be linked directly to credit rating, at least because any default ultimately absorbed must 
be counted as part of the cost of credit. So, it is important that a technically sound and well-
informed credit rating system be in place as a condition for development of a strong financial 
market for derivatives. The issue is broader since, as the CDB reports, “[c]apital markets 
development in the Caribbean has been handicapped by … the absence of national or regional credit 
rating agencies.” The CDB has provided equity support for the establishment of the Caribbean 
Information and Credit Rating Service Limited (CariCRIS) to address this constraint. Credit rating 
takes time and skills of the specialist credit analysts and the process of rating is data-intensive 
(confidential) and costly, addressing characteristics such as the following (Choudhry, 2004:8-14): 
• The financial position of the borrower, including its balance sheet position and anticipated 
cash flows and revenues. 
• Management quality and other firm specific issues. 
• The ability of the firm to meet scheduled interest and principal payments in any currency 
as due. 
• Industry outlook and competition within it. 
• Related macroeconomic economic outlook and competition within it. 
Consideration should be given to an accelerated development programme for this agency. 
One possible step is that part of development banking reform will be the requirement that 
development banks and affiliated Tier II institutions use its services.  
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Some gains from CARICOL - standardisation and information flows 
To function adequately, CARICOL would need to ensure that certain standards are established as 
early as possible so that its swaps can be marketed smoothly. These refer to a number of 
uncertainties related to interpretation of contract provisions that are inherent in a credit swap 
financial contract. There arise issues of rights and obligations for each party to the contract, whether 
buyer or seller. For example, in the swap, there will be: 
• Monthly or quarterly payments for protection due to the protection seller. 
• Provisions for the orderly settlement of contract in the event of default. 
• Each contract will contain triggers, specification of events that call forth a payment by one 
party to another. For example, there are indications as to whether renegotiation of 
contracts by some targeted beneficiary constitutes a credit event that is a trigger. 
In all legal contracts there are uncertainties about how the details of the contracts will apply 
when there are unforeseen event and these uncertainties create legal risk. In the early stages of 
development of the credit derivatives market in the USA, the issue became paramount and market 
participant had to collaborate to address the issues directly. It is appropriate to observe therefore, 
that one dimension of the CARICOL mandate should be to initiate the process of addressing a 
number of legal and contractual difficulties that can be anticipated (Bomfim, 2005: 26; 285-297): 
• Counterparties are likely to have their own preferred set of stipulations. 
• The main end-users are likely to have strong preferences for key definitions and events covered. 
• Without standardisation, it would be  
− very expensive to the parties and the market to put together agreeable terms; 
− extremely difficult to arrive at fair market values and premiums for each type of risk; 
− costly for authorities to keep track of the legal, pricing and organisational aspects of the 
various contracts; 
− unlikely that the derivatives market could grow and achieve the optimal level of liquidity 
needed to address flexibly the needs of the priority sectors. 
Among the related issues to be addressed would be routine data gathering on transactions of 
Tier II agencies, procedures, disputes and other events, and use these data to guide standardisation 
and upgrade, and routine information sharing at appropriate levels.  
Managing measurement risk 
In applying all the collateral devices available to CARICOL, the counterparties need a method of 
quantifying the risk factors inherent in either the swaps or the direct collateralisation and 
securitisation and translating these into a fair price. It does not matter that in this case some of the 
services might be fully subsidised to the end-user. To determine the fair price it should offer for 
protection to the Tier II institutions and ultimately the end-user, CARICOL would needs good 
estimates of the following: 
• The credit quality and default risk of the end-users (target groups). 
• The credit quality and default risk of the Tier II institution. 
• The level of legal risk involved. 
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The Tier II institutions need similar data to determine the best ways to protect its clients, 
given all options available including those from CARICOL. 
A risk measurement strategy has to be developed that is applicable to the circumstances of the 
Caribbean. Here, the main concerns are (i) the limited data availability in a Caribbean context, 
where the corporate community does not issue wide range of corporate notes with respect to which 
a yield curve can be properly specified so that the effective prices can be used as reference point for 
risk valuation at any given time; (ii) significant differences in liquidity that is likely to exist in the 
markets for government bonds, stocks and credit derivatives (Ministry of Finance, 2004).20 These 
situations have to be addressed by suitably dynamic21 and sophisticated models of the probability of 
default of the target customers as the basis for discounting and estimating the price of their credit 
risk, after adjusting for the subsidies. The best option for the market participant in these 
circumstances is to proceed with access to sophisticated mathematical modelling of credit risk to 
characterise the fair market value of credit derivatives. These models are generally based on 
stochastic differential equations22 and include the structural Black and Scholes (1973) model,23 
reduced from models (Cherubini, et al., 2004: 6-47; Duffie and Singleton, 2003; Jarrow and 
Turnbull, 1995), and the even more sophisticated recent models based on copula functions (Nelsen, 
1999; Cherubini, et al., 2004).24 There are extensions for realism. Geske (1977) and Geske and 
Johnson (1977) addressed coupon bond debt. Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), among others, introduced default events prior to maturity and the effects of debt 
seniority structures. The effects of bankruptcy costs, strategic debt-servicing behaviour and absolute 
priority violations have been considered by Madan and Unal (2000). Shimko, Tejim, and van 
Deventer (1993) introduced stochastic riskless rates. Some authors, such as Zhou (1996) and Duffie 
and Lando (2001) address one of the basic assumptions of the BSM, which is that the value of the 
firms evolves in continuous time, without regard to jump discontinuities. This excludes sudden 
moves to bankruptcy and the like and implies credit spreads that substantially underestimate reality. 
Zhou (1996) introduces such jump discontinuities. Duffie and Lando (2001) assume that the value 
of the firm is non-observable in continuous time. 
Development of a sound pricing capability will require that several critical data challenges be 
addressed to deal with the analytical complexities underlying the development of a price 
information system. For example, even if a vibrant and broadly ranged corporate bond market was 
to emerge, a zero-coupon bond would not be a good representation of a firm's liabilities. Further, 
balance sheet information is also a noisy indicator of the true state of a firm (Bomfin, 2005:178). 
The value of a firm (assets), a central variable in the standard models, is not observed in practice. 
The data more usually available are the book value of liabilities, the value of key assets, or shares 
outstanding or similar data that might be used to estimate equity or net worth in the case of some 
RDEs. Thus, even for a firm with a simple debt structure, there are substantial data challenges 
involved in measurement. For the Caribbean, the nature of the information challenge has not been 
defined. Apart from the specific challenges of the country-specific development paths, the 
information challenge would include the need to accommodate taxes and the informality reaction, 
                                                     
20  In these scenarios, simple static replication models and even dynamic models might not capture the effects of the liquidity 
differentials in the two markets. Indeed, what appears to be an opportunity for arbitrage could turn out to be an underlying function 
reflecting the ease or difficulty of transacting in corporate notes as compared to credit derivatives. Even more sophisticated models 
might mis-specify the differentials. 
21  Even standard dynamic replication models will be of little practical value in the Caribbean setting since RDES do not normally issue 
corporate notes and there are no readily observed prices of notes to be used as reference points. 
22  A stochastic differential equation is a differential equation in which one or more of the terms is a stochastic process, thus resulting in 
a solution that is itself stochastic. In particular, in finance it is of interest when a standard constant of proportional change usually 
treated as a rate of return is changed to a stochastic rate. 
23  The Black-Scholes-Merton model is a famous example.  
24  Copula functions are multivariate distribution functions whose one-dimensional marginal distributions functions are uniform on the 
interval (0,1). They provide the most general methods of measuring the degree of co-movement between any set of random variables, 
more accurate than correlations even in near linear contexts. 
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bankruptcy costs, agency costs, variable riskless rates and similar factors that cause the commonly 
identified relations to break down. 
Macroeconomic growth, volatility and linked budgetary reforms 
There is also the need to recognise that the value of the firm is not the only variable that would 
influence either the probability of default or the recovery rate associated with default, especially in 
the context of the direct collateralisation services offered in collaboration with the international 
development partners. Thus, data used to model credit spreads (prices of different levels of risk) 
must capture not only the level of debt and default risk but also the feedback effect on the output 
and product prices of an RDE. It is now well-known that the problems of risk measurement models 
can only be solved by capturing both firm-level and macroeconomic data in measuring credit risk. 
For so-called developed countries, significant steps have been taken in this direction by Tang and 
Yan (2005). Suitable analysis remains to be done for the Caribbean and are needed even if 
protection did not include devices such as credit swaps. 
A measurement initiative 
Against this background, it is recommended that a regional risk measurement initiative be 
established in the University of the West Indies, perhaps initially at the Mona School of Business to 
take advantage of the available local datasets on the one hand and the presence of a large pool of 
target beneficiaries on the other.  
Linked budgetary reform 
A major source of volatility that affects risk and risk-pricing at the level of the investor is country 
GDP, in particular its growth and variability. The public interest in achieving desired growth rates 
while reducing such volatility as a means of cutting the cost of credit should also be simultaneously 
pursued from a complementary budgetary perspective through a process of democratisation of the 
budgetary process to feature greater partnership between the state and non-state sectors in order to 
ensure clear signals and effective leadership to the private sector in defining national priorities, 
focusing on the following: 
• More coherent and transparent planning process in sector-wide modalities and with a financial 
sector-wide component, aimed at ensuring greater ownership by the non-state stakeholders.  
• The process would have to involve adequate representation of the self-employed as stakeholders.  
• A concept of development partners broadened to include interests in the so-called “developing 
countries,” especially the emerging large growth engines.  
• A strong mechanism for routine data analysis and information sharing, including data on 
the available resource windows and the market possibilities that the development agenda 
can address. This would have to be much different to the “demand-driven and reluctant 
response” culture that prevails everywhere in Caribbean countries today and will take 
clear national leadership to work.25 
• Suitable modes of dialogue to ensure that all relevant partner representatives can find a 
place in the decision-making process to tackle the targeted difficult changes in the 
historical practices that lead to conflict between maintenance of privilege and pursuit of 
                                                     
25  It might be worth noting here that recent legislations relating to the public’s right of access do not adequately address these concerns. 
Weak information sharing systems and the absence of inclusive mechanisms of dialogue create a substantial drag on the conduct of 
both private decision-making and on the preparation of budgets that can adequately signal national priorities with which the non-state 
financial sector agree, own and will devote resources to implement.  
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development through the market. In particular, all of the above adjustments should lead to 
a dialogue mechanism that allows  
− Strong articulation between national planning of priority changes,  
− The budget exercise.  
− Planning of sector/thematic activities. 
− Strong private sector awareness of and participation in shaping national priorities. 
Selected regulatory issues 
It could be expected that once CARICOL issues credit swaps, they will enter the market for 
securities across the region. Significant regulatory issues also arise once swaps issued by CARICOL 
enter the securities market. If addressed in the context of the reform of development banks, credit 
swaps would add further stimulus to the current financial reform process. Some of these relate to the 
requirement (and the growing practice of development banks documented above) that banks hold 
capital in reserve to cover eventual default-related losses in their loan portfolios and these are 
subject to international agreement under the Basle Bank Capital Accords, with current reference to 
the Basle II Accord.26 
Among the major benefits of introducing swaps from a triple-A institution such as CARICOL 
should be is that the swaps simultaneously upgrade the capacity of banks and other financial 
institutions to manage regulatory capital, diversify their portfolios, short (sell) any available 
corporate bonds and hedge against risk by buying corporate bonds (local or international). 
Moreover, development of a swaps market provides monetary authorities and other market 
participants with an alternative way to measure market and economic performance, especially in a 
context in which there is no significance yet attached to a local yield curve on corporate (and 
government) bonds.  
The general approach to regulatory capital used by banks and other financial institutions is to 
move loans to highly rated borrowers off the balance sheet while retaining lower rated borrowers on 
the balance sheet. One reason for this is that Basle I regulation, still in place in Caribbean countries, 
gives the same weight to the low rated and the high rated borrower. Essentially, if a stronger 
secondary market for loans emerges in the Caribbean, banks could increasingly achieve this move 
by selling or securitising the loans to the highly rated customers, thereby freeing up capital that was 
tied to these loans. However, there are substantial costs to such a manoeuvre in terms of adverse 
effects on customer relations. Instead of promoting development of the secondary loan market in the 
first instance, banks could be more easily encouraged to participate in a CARICOL swaps market 
and benefit from the anonymity and confidentiality of that process. 
Under Caribbean rules, bank exposure normally needs to be reported to appropriate 
regulatory authorities, who may in turn restrict further the amount of money a bank can lend or the 
standards of credit worthiness to be met when a bank is holding debt by treating the derivatives in a 
manner consistent with Basle I. There are two ways the market proposed above can address this 
issue. One is to promote synthetic securitisation and other derivatives by ensuring high-quality 
reform of development banks. The other is to phase in Basle II regulations in the latter context. 
                                                     
26  The general guidelines were first detailed in the 1988 Basle Bank Capital Accord. This has since been updated in 2003.  
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At the same time, it is clear that when banks are encouraged to employ credit derivatives, this 
should be consistent with the spirit of the concerns of the monetary authorities with managing 
inflation and the orderly development of the capital markets. Thus, regulators should carefully 
consider how to treat the credit default swaps on the books of the banks. Should the derivative still 
be treated as a loan to the reference entity? Reformed development banks can play a crucial role in 
developing new practice in the context of the liberalisation of the financial markets to allow 
CARICOM-wide activity. 
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Report summary 
We can now summarise our findings. This paper is concerned with how 
development banks might be reformed to be part of the wider agenda of 
development of the financial sector, including the market for commercial 
paper and bonds and the equity market. Ongoing reforms in the financial 
sector seek to improve resource flows for productive investment.  
Nevertheless, there are persistent fractures and imperfections in 
the credit market. Development banking seeks to define and resolve 
the imperfections in credit markets and to address concerns regarding 
social equity by targeting loan and other support resources to priority 
sectors that seek to use underemployed resources for capital 
accumulation and growth. The paper suggests steps that reconcile these 
objectives in a Caribbean economy. 
Framework of analysis 
The framework of analysis takes account of the implications for 
development strategy of two features of the labour (human capital) 
market: (i) large numbers of self-employed persons as development 
potential still outside the capitalist wage-labour market; and (ii) the 
development of a real domestic capital sector – human and physical and 
the creation of significant externalities when this capital is applied in 
production. In Caribbean economies today, monetary expenditure for 
profit, especially as credit, is the prime driver of production and change. 
Use of that profit to accumulate domestic capital, in partnership with 
foreign capital, has become a major means by which firms successfully 
increase asset turnover and value and ultimately develop the economy.  
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Development banks are relevant in this context because there are persistent fractures and 
imperfections in the credit market that severely restrict the flow of credit to facilitate the 
accumulation of domestic capital. Development banking seeks to define and resolve the 
imperfections in credit markets and to address concerns regarding social equity by targeting loan 
and other support resources to priority sectors that seek to use underemployed resources for capital 
accumulation and growth. This study is motivated by the question of how development banking 
might be successfully reformed in service of financial sector development to fund the domestic 
capital accumulation process. 
The method adopted was to use available data to assess 
• The success in targeting a high percentage of loans to capital-intensive activity in order to 
achieve a high asset turnover. 
• Whether development financing institutions maintain a low loss rate of direct loans 
relative to a high rate of credit flows, especially since the loss rate is an integral part of the 
cost of providing credit.  
• Whether the development bank flows are providing adequate coverage of the intended 
market. 
• Whether the program is having an impact on improving the growth rate and economic 
viability of the target groups.  
Where data are available, such measures were considered. However, a major problem 
confronted by this study was lack of secondary data and lack of resources to field suitable primary 
surveys to collect relevant information. We have used a focus group of stakeholder institutions in 
Jamaica to address the gaps in data.27 
Development banks were established to operate primarily in Tier II mode, in the sense of 
direct lenders and suppliers of other complementary support to the final end-users of credit. Tier I 
status refers to lending to the financial intermediaries serving end-users, such as commercial banks, 
credit unions and other financial intermediaries and has evolved over time, largely in response to 
the need for reform of the Tier II institutions. 
In the early 1980s, within the wider structural adjustment and liberalisation framework, 
financial sector reforms were initiated to allow greater facility of market forces in the pricing and 
allocation of financial resources. With lesson learned, some costly, the sector has been increasingly 
liberalised since then with subsequent on-going reform addressing the legislative and regulatory 
frameworks. 
Some of the reforms have targeted the development banking sector, with (i) privatisation 
initiatives; (ii) integration of institutions and internal reforms to achieve greater financial viability 
and less dependence on the state; and (iii) conversion from the founding Tier II mode to Tier I 
mode. 
Ultimately, the initiatives seek to promote high professional standards, efficient liquidity 
management and deployment and the orderly and efficient operation of the money and capital 
market, including the development of a corporate bond market and a variety of secondary markets 
such as the secondary market for loans. 
                                                     
27  The group included the Bank of Jamaica(); Development Bank of Jamaica(General Manager); National Commercial Bank Jamaica 
Limited(Senior Assistant General Manager and Manager, SME); Jamaica National Building Society; Victoria Mutual Building 
Society; Jamaica Mortgage Bank; Financial Services Commission; Churches Co-operation Credit Union; written comments (General 
Manager); University of the West Indies, Mona, (Principal); Mona School of Business (Director). Most institutions sent more than 
one senior representative. 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 196 New directions for development banking in the Caribbean:… 
71 
Generally, these initiatives have led to more viable Tier I enterprises but the Tier II 
development banks remain a problem. Further, crucially, the reforms have not yet successfully 
triggered progress towards solving either the problem of persistent excess liquidity or the problem 
of very narrow and underdeveloped markets for corporate bonds, secondary markets. Just as crucial 
in the context of this study, neither the broad financial sector reforms nor the more targeted frequent 
reforms of development banks have solved the historical problem of inadequate and unduly 
expensive credit to priority sectors, especially the creative sectors that are becoming increasing 
important for the copyright income they generate.  
The key findings 
Central development issue 
In the modern Caribbean economy, the central development issue concerns how to increase asset 
turnover by upgrading and restructuring the types of assets employed to include a greater reliance 
on domestic capital.  
Priority sectors 
Indeed, the priority development sectors are essentially those that are making intensive use of such 
domestic capital, and are prone to high creativity in that sense, whatever the specific activity 
involved – sport, general copyright industries, creative agriculture, and so on. 
Efficacy of credit expansion to priority sectors and key challenge 
Expansion of the money supply through an increase in credit to the priority sectors can supplement 
profits as a source of working capital and finance for fixed capacity building and human capital 
development and therefore create profits and savings at an increasing rate.  
The key challenge of development banking today is to facilitate this process by addressing 
persistent fractures and imperfections in the credit market as well as related concerns regarding 
social equity. Development banks target loans and other support resources directly or indirectly to 
priority sectors that seek to use underemployed resources for capital accumulation and growth.  
Traditional development banks provide direct Tier II lending. However, Tier I lending has 
been growing and proving effective. This has largely been in the form of sourcing and steering 
cheaper funds to direct lenders with the expectation that there would be an increased flow to the 
priority sectors. The central question is what additional indirect mechanisms might be put in place 
to encourage a greater flow of credit to the target sectors at a lower cost? 
A note on credit and inflation 
In the medium term, inflation is not an inherent consequence of credit expansion to address modern 
capital sector development possibilities as set out above, especially if regulatory capacity is considered.  
However, in the modern era, development banks would have to be designed to focus less on 
supply of working capital and import capacity and more on development of the domestic capital 
component of the asset base even as all forms of spending grow. That in turn would require an 
appropriate capacity to capture and spread the associated risks. Recommendations address this capacity.  
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Experience of development banks 
Founded under government ownership and control, development banks were forced to function in a 
manner that converted them into social-sector transfer mechanisms, transferring public funds to 
address the needs of many sectors in a way that offered little prospects of viability. Thus, 
development banks have largely been Tier II institutions. Most of these have not worked well and 
certainly have not led the transformation of the regional labour market. Jamaica’s labour market 
profile is proof of that. 
Specifically, development banks have not created sufficient viable capacity of development 
banks to borrow or earn market-determined surplus and thus supply suitable financial services to 
targeted development sectors with confidence. Development banks have achieved relatively greater 
success when operations shift to Tier I mode. 
Reforms have moved in the direction of increasing the internal efficiency of the Tier II banks 
lending directly to the end-users of credit, privatisation, or establishment of Tier I banks that lend 
and on-lend to the direct lenders. Tier I banking has proven to be relatively more profitable and to 
provide some stimulus to the financial sector through the flow of relatively low-cost concessionary 
funds for direct lending and on-lending. 
However, these reforms do not address adequately the fundamental challenge of moving 
resources efficiently to the priority sectors focused on domestic capital accumulation and capacity 
building in a context where the market would normally avoid exposure to their high credit risk. 
Current importance of development banking in the financial sector 
The general tendency is for development banks to be of minor significance in the current financial 
system and indeed to be losing its significance as the commercial sector increases its exposure to the 
credit risks of the priority development sectors of the economy. In terms of the capacity to issue 
credit, the share of total banking assets also reveal that development banks are of limited 
significance in the general scheme.  
Reforms are therefore not likely to be highly costly in terms of a fall in aggregate credit flows 
even as they bring huge gains in terms of the stimulus provided to boost the flow of finance to 
priority sectors. On the other hand, with failure to reform the following net social costs of 
development banks will tend to remain high or even grow: 
• The opportunity costs of misallocation of resources and bad debts. 
• High social costs of credit even when interest is subsidised. 
• High operating expenses to operating income. 
• Low or absent profitability. 
• Sub-optimal liquidity ratios associated with the inappropriate allocation of resources. 
• High level of liabilities relative to equity. 
Baseline reforms of development banking sector 
Several types of reforms are proposed to ensure a pool of local Tier II development financing 
institutions that can achieve the basic goals of the development banking sector while minimising the 
problems. We take as key goals: 
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• Viable provision of the maximum possible credit flows to the priority sectors defined in 
terms of their orientation to employ high levels of domestic capital in economic activity. 
• Supply of credit at reasonable cost without the large-scale losses that characterise the 
traditional Tier II development banking system. 
• Ensuring timely responses to loan requests and loan-servicing requests. 
• Improvement of the related technical assistance to the target sectors to ensure 
development of their economic viability and competitive. 
To pursue these goals, we propose the following: 
• There is need for improved analysis of  
− The scale and nature of the persistent fractures and imperfections in the credit market. 
− The degree of inequity as defined in terms of access to credit for domestic capital 
formation versus access to credit for foreign capital formation. 
− The associated true direct and opportunity costs of inadequate credit to priority sectors.  
− Against this background, the target of development banking should be redefined to 
emphasize domestic capital formation. That is, development banking seeks to define and 
resolve the imperfections in credit markets and to address concerns regarding social 
equity by targeting loan and other support resources to priority sectors that seek to use 
underemployed resources for capital accumulation and growth.  
• In so far as they remain in the lending business, development banks should be Tier I 
operations, regional or local in scope, focused primarily on financing the development and 
employment of domestic real capital in all sectors of the economy but with priority to the 
capital producing sectors such as education, health, housing and the real assets of the 
creative enterprises. 
• Large-scale private equity is desirable to increase responsiveness to market signals and 
ensure increasing viability over time, especially as that relates to attracting credit to 
support increasing investment in domestic capital.  
• Significant, but not dominant, public investment is desirable to represent the public 
interest in addressing market failure in a private sector setting – the board-rooms of 
privatised development banks. This relative dominance of the private sector would 
simultaneously ensure the following: 
− Improved and more flexible modalities of capitalisation that gives adequate room for 
private sector participation and ultimately the phasing out of public equity in the long 
term. 
− Greater flexibility, institutional autonomy, market sensitivity in loan decision-making 
that would address the needs of the wider market while still addressing the needs of the 
development community. 
− Improved, more market-driven recruitment of management skills. 
− Sensitivity to regulatory issues and a means of communicating government policy 
because of the government participation. 
− Rebalancing of the short term (especially working capital) and long term focus 
(installation of real capital assets) of the loan portfolio of the banks to reflect a greater 
measure of the efficiencies demanded by the market. 
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− Freedom from undue and inappropriate political interference. 
• A crucial lesson of the DFL experience is that international equity participation in the 
reformed development banks is highly desirable and should be encouraged by specific 
policy and regulatory initiatives. This should include equity from the large so-called 
developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India. 
• To address the goal of boosting the prospects for competitive success, a special 
CARICOM Regional Technical Support Vehicle (CRTSV) to provide active and partially 
subsidised technical support for the target sectors and to develop suitable business models 
in collaboration with them. The vehicle should be required to operate profitably and 
should be linked actively to strengthened regional devices such as the CARICOM 
Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ) and to local counterparts such 
as the Standards Bureaus and other Research Institutions.  
• One possibility is to reform the Caribbean Industrial Research Institute (CARIRI) for this 
purpose. 
• In the context of some steps to privatisation, development banks should be required to 
operate according to specific standards and monitored and evaluated accordingly: These 
should include 
− Adequate attention to development of product lines and instruments to attract the new 
types of customers emerging from the development process, with a view to creating 
pressure on the private sector and the affiliated private Tier II institutions to do the same.  
− Development banks should be guided and evaluated by specific targets and measurable 
goals, including 
° Steady improvement in the viability of supply of credit flows to the priority sectors 
defined in terms of their orientation to employ high levels of domestic capital in 
economic activity. 
° Target rate of return on assets or asset turnover. 
° Steady improvement in the supply cost of credit over some target period. 
° Steady improvement in the timeliness of responses to loan request and loan-
servicing requests from the key target sectors. 
° The success achieved by the beneficiaries of the services of development banks in 
the context of the support for development of viable business models. 
• These baseline changes will be insufficient to address the problems inhibiting suitable 
targeting of credit to the priority sectors.  
• Agreements from stakeholder focus group: This report adopts three propositions from 
the stakeholder consultations: 
− Tier I Development banks, including the CDB, should increase partnership with the 
credit unions, home mortgage banks and other similar institutions to provide Tier II 
services to the target sector. Over time, such private affiliated institutions should 
replace all Tier II institutions that are unable to demonstrate ability to meet clearly 
designated performance standards. 
− A CARICOM Regional Collateralisation, Securitisation and Collection Vehicle 
(CARICOL) should be established to provide a single regional channel for  
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° Effective debt collection when default occurs, with adequate recovery opportunity 
provided in conjunction with the CRTSV. 
° Two types of securitisation and collateralisation supports to customers through 
Tier II institutions, on the other: 
1. Pooled International collateral and securitisation support for customers, similar 
to the support now provided by the USAID through Tier II institutions. 
2. Pooled government collateral and securitisation support for customers, with 
the support. 
− Increase the use of cash-flow lending by the commercial banking sector, with 
particular reference to the target sector. This should be introduced on a harmonised and 
phased basis by establishment of a regional financial sector task force to consider the 
merits and modalities of such a step, including all regulations and accounting standards 
that would attend the move. The mechanism should be linked to the CARICOL vehicle 
mentioned above. 
• Posting of collateral is normally expensive and the ability to use public resources, 
especially public fixed assets, along with international development assistance will be a 
distinct advantage if properly administered and monitored. 
• Regarding the securitisation mechanism, the CDB collaboration agreement is a good example 
of what should be done. Affiliated Tier II institutions, including those from the private sector, 
should benefit from the system on the basis of clearly indicated and regionally coordinated 
agreement on the extent of lowering of interest costs to the target sector.  
• Phased Introduction of Credit Default Swaps – Another View - In addition, it is suggested that 
to provide a basket of supplementary protection for credit issues under the above schemes and 
to facilitate capital market development, a CARICOM initiative should be established to allow 
for introduction of a regional mechanism for insuring credit to the target sector. The process 
should start with a Phase I featuring introduction of credit insurance in the form of credit 
default swaps – to take advantage of simplicity and ease of administration.  
• One of the more successful government-owned Tier II development banks in Jamaica and 
CARICOM, the National Export-Import Bank of Jamaica has long been providing export 
credit insurance as one of its primary services to the export-substitution sector. In the light 
of the downturn in such export activity, it has been actively considering the introduction 
of local credit insurance as a substitute service. 
• Swap Design: CARICOL is proposed as the protection-selling counter party and can sell 
either single-name or multi-name swaps but the multi-name swaps are likely to be most 
relevant to the target beneficiaries. The single-name swaps would be an especially 
attractive way to deal with those customers who evolve rapidly into large private 
capitalists and drop out of the scheme. However, perhaps the more important device for 
the newly emerging or socially disadvantaged investors will be the multi-name credit 
default swap that groups customers into a basket such that the definition of default would 
vary in terms of defaults by individual customer or the portfolio as a whole. 
• Reservation/Caveat: The main caveat to be considered in determining if CARICOL should 
be established is whether the cost of insurance will be prohibitive and lead to more 
expensive rather than cheaper credit. This was raised directly by the stakeholder group. 
However, CARICOL insurance would simultaneously strengthen the other forms of direct 
collateral support it provides with regional and international collaboration as described 
above and would also be reinforced by its collection activities. Since the price can be 
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subsidised and the risk coverage will be complemented by the other direct collateralisation 
and collection services offered by CARICOL, the overall effect should be to lower the 
cost of credit while encouraging the evolution of a market for another type of financial 
instrument.  
• How should CARICOL be Owned? Lessons from Best Practice Cases: USA and UK: In 
addition to the regional governments and the international development partners, 
provision should be made for CARICOL to provide a capital investment opportunity for 
banks and insurance companies as well as securities houses to develop the desired 
institution. Moreover, notwithstanding the underlying programme of complementary 
securitisation with real assets, the goal should be to create a triple-A rated institution with 
falling public participation over time. 
• How Should CARICOL Services Be Delivered? In each country, CARICOL services 
can be delivered through the Tier I development banks, reformed to include a strong credit 
collateralisation, insurance and collections unit. 
• Urgent Strengthening of CariCRIS: To ensure adequate supporting credit-rating services, 
consideration should be given to an accelerated development programme for CariCRIS. 
One possible step is that part of development banking reform will be the requirement that 
development banks and affiliated Tier II institutions use its services.  
• Standards: To function adequately, CARICOL would need to ensure that certain standards 
are established as early as possible so that its swaps can be marketed smoothly. These 
refer to a number of uncertainties related to interpretation of contract provisions that are 
inherent in a credit swap financial contract.  
• Managing Measurement Risk: A risk measurement strategy has to be developed that is 
applicable to the circumstances of the Caribbean. It is recommended that a regional risk 
measurement initiative be established in the University of the West Indies, perhaps 
initially at the Mona School of Business to take advantage of the available local datasets 
on the one hand and the presence of a large pool of target beneficiaries on the other.  
• Linked Budgetary Reform: A major source of volatility that affects risk and risk-pricing in 
CARICOM countries is the macroeconomic cash flow, in particular the GDP. Concern is 
especially with GDP growth and volatility. The public interest in achieving desired 
growth rates while reducing such volatility as a means of cutting the cost of credit should 
also be simultaneously pursued from a complementary budgetary perspective through a 
process of democratisation of the budgetary process to feature greater partnership between 
the state and non-state sectors in order to ensure clear signals and effective leadership to 
the private sector in defining national priorities. 
• Regulatory Issues: Regulators should carefully consider how to treat the credit default swaps 
on the books of the banks. Should the derivative still be treated as a loan to the reference 
entity? This is precisely where reformed development banks can play a crucial role, along 
with the liberalisation of the financial markets to allow CARICOM-wide activity. 
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Follow-up analysis 
Given resource limitations, the analysis was based a sample of development banks from across the 
Caribbean for which data were readily available. A follow-up analysis should be conducted that 
uses as its main method the design and fielding of a suitable instrument to obtaining primary data 
from all the development banks as well as from a reasonable sample of the other commercial 
entities in the CARICOM region. The study should address the core matters discussed in the 
stakeholder group meeting held in Jamaica and reported in Tables 28-30 as well as in the proposals 
for reform. These are mainly: (i) a regional approach to collateralisation and loan guarantees; and (i) 
the costs and benefits of introducing a related credit default swap instrument with initial support 
from the national and international development community. 
Significant consideration should also be given to assembling a suitable CARICOM research 
team for this purpose, with particular regard to the establishment of a regional device such as the 
proposed CARICOL to underwrite the introduction of a credit default swap on a regional basis. 
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